*
Sunday, March 31, 1940
Rotten weather. I stay indoors and work, bringing my Diary to date. The French and the British hold frequent, definitely long conferences – now in Paris, now in London – attended by militaries and politicians. This incessant activity evinces the huge concern shown by the commands of the two armies in light of the enemy’s impending offensive. The French-British air force is ever more active as it keeps dropping bombs on military targets inside Germany.
Meanwhile, in our country, as the saying goes, they are playing chess while the house is burning! Carol, – surrounded by his grand advisers including the ubiquitous royal counselors of exceptional acumen in matters of decorations Iorga, Argetoianu and Vaida – is diligently studying a new Statute of decorations, the shape, inscriptions and ribbons that would best suit the new medals Bene merenti and the Bene Merenti Cross! Had this information not been made public by our dailies people would have had no inkling of what occupies the leaders of this state at such tragic moments!
Monday, April 1, 1940
Last night, I listened on some foreign radio station to the disquisition made by Molotov three days ago before the Supreme Soviet in connection with the war in Finland and Moscow’s foreign policy. Today our papers carry ample excerpts from his speech, especially with regard to Romania. One can note Molotov’s major preoccupation to explain the Russian militaries’ failure by the fact that the Soviets had to bear the wide front set up by the whole capitalist world rushing to the rescue of Finland with enormous supplies of ammunition and armament. Among others, he mentioned 350 planes, 1,500 canons, 6,000 machine guns, 100 thousand rifles, 650 hand grenades, two million five thousand shells, 160 million cartridges, etc. etc. Molotov assessed the number of Russian casualties at 48,745 dead and 158,864 wounded, while the Finns posted 60,000 dead and 250,000 wounded, “half of the Finnish strength,” he specified. “We were liberal with Finland,” Molotov further said, “since we did not ask for the war damages to which we would have been entitled, and then we also gave up taking the whole territory of the country which was at our disposal.” The swine! They now play at magnanimity when all the time they did nothing but shamelessly claim that between the Soviets and Finland there was no state of war! Now they own to the losses they kept on denying! How could anyone place any reliance on the word of such brazen swine!
As to our country, this is what the head of the Soviet diplomacy said: “In Romania, where in 1938 our man, Butenko vanished mysteriously, we have only a chargé d’affaires to represent us. The Soviets did not acknowledge the annexation of Bessarabia, a litigious issue left pending, but have never raised the question of its return at the point of the sword so that there is no reason for the Soviet-Romanian relations to sour.”
For the rest, Molotov is keen on specifying two things: that the foreign policy of the Soviets is aimed at peace and good neighborly relations, and as far as the war in Europe is concerned, they never pledged anything else to Germany than straddling the fence. Are those declarations honest? Don’t they betray a certain unease? The matter must be carefully analyzed.
Round eleven, I phone Lupu[i] but he is not at home. Costache Lupu tells me his brother will be busy all morning, and that I could find him only after six in the afternoon. I suspect he is in conference with Tătărescu[ii] in connection with metropolitan Gurie. Before noon I drop by our house in Vatra Luminoasă to see if the finishing works are making good progress. I then sign an additional 200,000 lei contract at the Construction House for wood shutters for the windows. The sidewalks are nearly done but there is no sign of the fences.
By six I go to Lupu’s where I find Fănel Mihăiescu and Hoisescu. Lupu is telling them how he quarreled with Tătărescu at noon because of Gurie, stressing that it ill-suited him and Carol to drag to court an innocent man of such merit. Then Lupu touched the matter of our relations with the Soviets in the wake of Molotov’s speech. Lupu has got the gist of the situation. He feels the Soviets would be willing to talk with us now that they fear a German attack. In his opinion, it is the only explanation for Molotov’s moderate, conciliatory tone as he must be worried stiff at the way the war develops on the Western front, especially when besieged with so many rumors about an impending German-Russian war. He tried to assure both Hitler and the French and British at the same time that the Soviets wanted peace and to stay neutral. Consequently, Lupu proposed Tătărescu to determine Carol to put out feelers in Moscow in this sense, possibly instructing our chargé d’affaires there to intercede with Molotov. Tătărescu hit the roof, saying that under the circumstances such a thing was out of the question as it would ruin “all our arrangements with Berlin to which King Carol is very much partial and which have been reached after tremendously big efforts.” Lupu drew his attention to the danger this rapprochement to Germany could incur us, on the one hand because of France and England, and on the other because of the Soviets who could not possibly stay indifferent. “Each with his responsibilities,” Tătărescu replied.
Lupu is waiting for Maniu’s[iii] return to see, together with the other members of the bureau, what could be done in this respect. Fănel Mihăiescu says he has tidings from Ghiţă Pop[iv] that Maniu could be back in the capital this very day of the following one at the most.
I congratulate Lupu for his interpretation of Molotov’s speech: “It’s exactly what I think.” “Les beau esprits se rencontrent,” he added with a smile.
March, April 2, 1940
As decided last night together with Lupu, this morning I’ve drawn up a memoir to Tătărescu because I know that Maniu will have nothing to do with Carol. I conceive it as if it were written by Maniu since I’m convinced nobody else would sign it in the end. I connect the memoir to the grave circumstances visited on this country which prompt the head of our party, and perhaps the Liberal one too, if Dinu Brătianu[v] signs it, to forego all political or constitutional scruples, and address a government leader who holds the post only de facto and not de jure. The paper reviews the foreign policy blunders ceaselessly made by the Romanian cabinet from 1936 on, coming to the conclusion that perhaps Molotov’s speech paved the last possible road to reach a modus vivendi with the Soviets. The government is above all warned of the unforgivable mistake of pursuing such close political ties with the German Reich. The Soviets could interpret them as a burgeoning alliance with the Germans and our Western allies as an encroachment of our pledges.
Round noon I get to see Lupu. He lunches at Filderman’s[vi] together with other worthies of the Jewish Community of Bucharest.
At 3 PM Maniu phones me to come and see him at 5. He arrived from Braşov at noon. Together we analyze the foreign situation in detail and we find ourselves in perfect agreement. Just like in the Molotov affair, Maniu thinks that the Russian’s discourse was an invitation to negotiations as he is persuaded that the Soviets have actually begun to fear a German attack. “For us,” he says, “it is a completely unexpected opportunity to clinch once and for all the question of Bessarabia.” I then read to him the memoir drawn up for Tătărescu. I give him a copy to show to Dinu Brătianu whom he is to see that evening at 8. Maniu is delighted by the presentation of the memoir and congratulates me that I have grasped his purport, namely that Tătărescu was recognized only de facto as a head of cabinet and not de jure.
The following day at 5 in the afternoon we will have a bureau meeting also attended by Mihalache,[vii] who arrives in Bucharest this evening. Maniu is happy that “Lupu stands his ground, which may influence Mihalache too.”
Wednesday, May 15, 1940
Holland has capitulated. The thing is confirmed at noon. A big battle is under way on the Meuse river. The Germans boast several successes, which have not yet been corroborated though.
The meeting of our bureau begins in this gloomy, sad atmosphere. Madgearu tells us that Mihalache cannot come to Bucharest this week. Popovici opines it’s a good thing he absents himself from our bureau meetings “as long as he hopes he can still do something for the party”. “Wishful thinking,” Lupu replies, stating that, judging by the way the Tătărescu Cabinet was cobbled together, he fails to understand what Mihalache can be waiting for, “not disposing of such an embarrassing councillorship.” Madgearu tries to defend him, but Lupu does not allow him to go on, briskly cutting in: “You’d better hold your tongue in this matter for he has taken your cue too long and now he’s become everybody’s laughingstock.”
Madgearu does not push it further as Lupu takes the floor and speaks about the party’s position vis-à-vis the foreign situation. He shows that the country risks to be dragged in the German camp by the current leaders who are just as maladroit as they are keen on saving their own bacon. In the wake of the German offensive to the West, “this rogue of Carol feels he is free today to implement his policy of collaboration with Hitler under the pretext it is only thus that we can protect ourselves against the aggression of the Soviets. The commercial agreements that he concludes with the Germans will bleed the country white. German agents scout the villages buying everything they can lay their hands on, paying in a currency which they know tomorrow will be worth as much as they want.” “We,” Lupu goes on, “must do out utmost; for this we must first know who we can count on in the undertaking we are going to start so that we do not wake up acting at cross-purposes, like times before. Therefore as a first step I suggest that our friends here, Messrs. Popovici[viii] and Madgearu[ix] sort it out with their friend in ideas, Mr. Mihalache, what position towards the party and towards Carol they will assume. If they can obtain a national government as they hope, fine, if not, they should come back to the party peacefully and carry out what we, Mr. Maniu and I, recommend. Our party can no longer play both ends against the middle, now being against Carol whom we request to abdicate, now spoiling for an understanding with this man who turns his back on us. It is embarrassing both for the party and for us all, to put up with undignified situations; in the end, better fewer and more closely-knit than more and unruly, incapable of common action. Therefore, I am waiting for our friends to clear out things so that we, the others, know what we have to do.”
I recall now Popovici took the floor after Lupu. Brought to date by the latter, Popovici spoke quite earnestly, and also with moderation. He admitted that he too was constantly at loggerheads with Maniu as regards the matter of Carol’s abdication. Not that he did not want it too or did not think it necessary for the country but only on grounds of political expedience. He did not think it possible without a civil war, and that he loathed. Thus, he agreed with Madgearu and Mihalache that a golden mean had to be adopted, likely to bring about an understanding with Carol. “Today I too have become convinced,” Popovici continued, “that indeed the road we have chosen cannot lead to the result expected, and therefore I think that Mihalache too will agree with me that we must end it as soon as possible. Still, I ask for a short respite to see what happens on the western front where things seem to be speeding to a denouement which could ease us out of the impasse, too.” He said that if the French-British concluded peace with Hitler and the latter sent his troops to Moscow we could get out of it by straddling the fence! Madgerau also supported this thesis, and fully backed the ideas put forth by Popovici.
Ghiţă Pop warmly upheld Lupu’s theory, eulogizing Maniu’s political foresight a tad too enthusiastically. The man himself felt slightly embarrassed. Our friend Ghiţă Pop allowed himself to be carried away by the topic and somehow overdid it, forgetting the Latin adage: Es modus in rebus! I spoke only a little, giving my approval to Lupu’s solution “which now, after the statements made by Messrs. Popovici and Madgearu I perceive much easier.” I wanted only to specify that a possible peace on the western front, behind the Soviets, was something of an utopia!
Maniu then took the floor. “All political mistake – when made in good faith and especially if admitted in time -,” he began, “can be explained and even forgiven. Today, in the grave circumstances visited upon this country no more error can be tolerated in connection with its interests. Therefore I thank Mr. Lupu for his welcome proposal and I acknowledge most gladly the pledge of Messrs. Popovici and Madgearu to make Mr. Mihalache realize the need to end all attempt at coming to an understanding with that rascal Carol.” Addressing Popovici and Madgearu he then gave them a true lesson of foreign policy, arousing my admiration and that of Lupu. Here it is in brief. “You claim that we should wait a little more as it is possible that things may get cleared up rapidly on the western front. And this would ease us out of the impasse. You are terribly wrong to believe such a thing. The war we are witnessing today has been smoldering for twenty-two years, since the 1918 flare-up could not solve the big problems of European balance. Today, looking at the Versailles Treaty from a historical vantage it appears more of an armistice convention than a peace treaty. All the problems left pending then – and do not forget that Russia did not take part in the Versailles talks as it was undergoing a civil war and had not yet emerged as an orderly state – are now begging for a solution, which further compounds things as the Soviets will come with their demands to the future bargaining table, starting with the Baltic to the Black Sea and the Aegean. How do you think these things could be possibly settled by a few battles, won or lost by this or that state. There will be a long-drawn war and it cannot end other than with Germany’s defeat. I am persuaded of this as if it were a mathematical truth. Britain and France are aware of the fact that Germany cannot cope with a long war, given its geographic position, and therefore they will do their utmost to gain time even if they cede other territories: the more the Germans will advance the weaker they will become because time is not on Germany’s side. You worry that the German army has taken Norway, Denmark, now Holland, Luxembourg and Belgium, and you fail to grasp the problems these occupied countries raise for the German Reich. You imagine the number of the troops needed to keep the peace in these states, beginning with Poland, up to Norway and the rest of the seashore of Denmark, Holland and Belgium? With what will the Germans feed all these populations if their blitzkrieg fails? I beg you to take into account all these things and not let yourself impressed by a victory or a passing defeat. Britain and France boast huge resources, to say nothing of the United States that will never accept Britain’s defeat. I am aware of the fact that German propaganda maintains that the United States would be glad to see Britain kneeling in order to seize the British colonial empire itself. It is one of the biggest political errors Hitler and his joint chiefs of staff could make if they gave this any credit. This is not the time to explain to you how absurd this armchair idea is. To conclude, I will reiterate my deep conviction for which I am ready to stake my neck, namely that Hitler will lose the war and woe on the poor German nation!”
Thursday, June 27, 1940
In the morning papers I read the letters by which Iunian and Gh. Cuza enroll in the Nation Party. [...] With Cuza it’s obvious but I would never have thought Iunian to be so spineless. I’m hugely disappointed. I have long suspected he is no true-blue democrat but I nurtured the illusion I might be wrong. Lupu knows him very well. He keeps on telling me Iunian is extremely high-reaching and besides his malice clouds his judgment! Now I understand better why this man has always refused to join us in our move against Carol.
Round 10, Lupu and C. Mihăilescu, all worked up, come to tell me that yesterday the Soviets gave us an ultimatum, asking us to evacuate Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina in four days, as of June 28. We have time to answer by midnight. Journalist Theodorescu-Branişte told Lupu, and Mihăilescu was appraised of this by his friend Bungeţeanu. A fine time for Maniu to be missing! Lupu phones Dinu Brătianu from my place and they agree for us to go to him at 11, and see what can be done. I ring Ghiţă Pop and Ionel Pop, who didn’t know anything, and tell them to also come to Dinu Brătianu’s. I then call Madgearu and invite him too. He is abreast of the Soviet ultimatum. He replies that he doesn’t see the point of going all to Brătianu’s place since it is the Cabinet’s and the Privy Council’s job to supply the Soviets with an answer. To cut a long story short I explain the invitation comes from Lupu, who also asks him to ring Mihalache upand enjoin him to return to the capital at once.
At 11, when we get there we find V. Sassu, Gh. Brătianu and Gh. Fotino already in. Right after us there come Madgearu, Ghiţă Pop and Ionel Pop.
Lupu suggests that before the meeting of the Privy Council and of the Council of Ministers, our party and the Liberal Party should present a brief note expressing our attitude vis-à-vis two matters: the creation of a national government right away, the definite rejection of the ultimatum, and the army’s general mobilization. Everybody is in favor of the proposal, except Gh. Brătianu and Madgearu who show reserve as to the rejection of the ultimatum. They do not think we can wage war against the Soviets who, they opine, have an understanding with Hitler. Nonetheless, they too accept to send the note proposed by Lupu. He draws it up at once. “The undersigned, members of the political bureau of the National Peasant Party and of the National Liberal Party ask the members of the Privy Council to decide on the immediate formation of a national government, the categorical rejection of the ultimatum, and the army’s general mobilization.” Lupu, Madgearu, Ghiţă Pop and I sign on our behalf, and Ionel Pop on Maniu’s behalf. On the Liberals’ part Dinu Brătianu, V. Sassu, Gh. Brătianu and Georges Fotino affix their signatures. Two notes have been drawn up, both written by Lupu. Dinu Brătianu promises to give one to Dr. Angelescu, and V. Sassu and Ghiţă Pop to hand the other to Tătărescu.
The meeting lasted only three quarters of an hour. Lupu accompanied Dinu Brătianu to Dr. Angelescu’s, and I walked out with Madgearu and Ionel Pop. We agreed to meet in the afternoon at 6 at Dinu Brătianu’s to learn about the results of our approaches.
Madgearu is very skeptical about our capacity to withhold a Soviet attack, especially as he is persuaded that the Bulgarians and the Hungarians will assault us together with the Soviets. Ionel Pop keeps quiet and nods, avoiding a definite position. As a matter of fact, he too is of the same opinion as Madgearu but is afraid to say anything because he fears Maniu. I contradict Madgearu, reminding him that what is going on today shouldn’t surprise us because we have long known this is where our policy will get us of spiting the Soviets and weakening the Little Entente, deeming this will ingratiate us with the Germans. And now we have come to this! “To me it is plain as the nose on my face that we have only one logical political solution: to go all to battle and fall, weapon in hand, in the defense of our frontiers. It is only thus that we will gain the world’s esteem, and when general peace comes we can hold our heads high in our quality as victims of the Nazis and their allies, the Bolsheviks!” “What you say is very nice, of course” Madgearu told me, “and definitely that’s what we should do if we could be sure that Britain will prevail in the war eventually but who can guarantee that? My impression is that Hitler won this one, and there’s nothing left for us to do than to come to an understanding with him, no matter how dear it will cost us.” We were now in Brătianu Square. I found it useless to continue our discussion, and as Ionel Pop kept silent I put an end to the conversation, said good-bye, and got on tramway 14 that took me home.
Mobilization seemed impending so I took out my military gear and aired it a bit. Then I started the necessary preparations in view of the draft. I was thinking it would be more appropriate to take my family to Bogdăneşti, the place being out of the way. Besides, there they would have the chance to breathe some fresh summer air and find it easier to get food. Milica too is in favor of this solution. A difficult time for us and for the country.
At 6 I go to Dinu Brătianu’s. All those who attended the morning meeting are present now too with the exception of Madgearu, who phoned Lupu he would go to Mihalache’s place to summon him to Bucharest. Dinu Brătianu and V. Sassu recount what they discussed with Angelescu and Tătărescu. The former approved the matters contained in the note and promised to read it in the meeting of the Privy Council. The latter wouldn’t hear about it. Tătărescu explained to Sassu that we couldn’t resist the Russian troops not for a week “since they would pulverize the Romanian population in Bessarabia availing themselves of the war pretext to exterminate it.” “Tătărescu confided in me something extremely important,” Sassu tells me, “provided, of course, it is not a lie which he is capable of: namely that the King is sure that very soon, with the help of Germany Northern Bukovina and Bessarabia will be recovered, and therefore we have no interest to destroy them now in a war against the Russians.” “Who can trust the words of a liar like Tătărescu and an ignominious bandit like his boss,” Lupu exclaims. “That would mean Hitler put all his eggs in Carol’s basket and then also entrusted such a secret to him, namely that the Soviets would attack very soon. Tell it to Carol and Guţă! Not to us! We’re not fooled by such a cock-and-bull story!” Dinu Brătianu thinks the same thing, whereas Gh. Brătianu is willing to take seriously the matter of an impending German-Russian war. He believes a German-Russian conflagration is inevitable in a year or two, and therefore he finds the decision to accept the Russian ultimatum – which the Privy Council and the Council of Ministers took today – to be just. Dinu Brătianu contradicts him, saying that among others, during the noon meeting at the palace chaired by Carol only 25 persons voted to accept the ultimatum, while 11 were against, ignoring the assurances of Carol and Tătărescu. “Mind you that among these 11 there was not a single enemy of Carol!” Dinu Brătianu added.
“It’s a sure thing,” I say, “that Germany, in its quality as heir of Austria cannot take in good part the Russians’ getting stationed at the mouths of the Danube. One day this will spoil the relations between these two big powers. But not yet! Hitler is up the creek without a paddle, what with the war with Britain and, most likely, with the United States right behind. No wonder if he doesn’t feel like getting mixed up with the Soviets right now. He cannot possibly allow anyone to infer that he is preparing to assail the Soviets, even if he actually was thinking about it. The argument brought by Carol and his minion is but a mere conjecture, if not a bare-faced lie meant to see him through this bad patch. Another in his place, if he felt any shame at all, would have packed his caboodle by now and fled somewhere in the world to rid the country of him!” Lupu and Ghiţă Pop fully approve my words while Sassu and Fotino consider me with certain admiration. Sassu tackles the matter of whether we could, nonetheless, wage war against the Soviets, the Bulgarians and the Hungarians, eventually concluding it will be useless. I repeat what I have told Madgearu in the morning, that it is better to die arm in hand and become victims of the Nazis and Bolsheviks as, in the end, victory will not be theirs. Sassu says, echoing Madegaru, he doesn’t believe in Britain’s triumph. As Gh. Brătianu deems a British victory – now that France is down – chimerical, adding that the Bulgarians and the Hungarians would pounce on us together with the Russians, “which means we will disappear from Europe’s map,” I reply instantly: “First what makes you so sure that the Bulgarians and the Hungarians will strike tomorrow? The Bulgarians are not so go-as-you-please, even if they are eager to charge. A mere muscle-flexing from Turkey and Greece would suffice to reduce them to silence. I don’t see these two countries accepting the Russians at the mouths of the Danube so light-heartedly. Then I don’t see the Yugoslavs willing to allow the Bulgarians to beleaguer us. The Balkan Entente, if I am not mistaken, has not yet been rescinded. As far as the Hungarians are concerned I don’t see them attacking us alongside the Russians either. In their quality as allies of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s can they collaborate with the Soviets to destroy us so that the Russians lay their hands on our petroleum and economic resources? I simply don’t imagine Hitler or Mussolini giving them such leeway; now we must show them how resolved to fight we are; our Balkan allies will thus be bolstered by our firm decision to wage war, and Hitler, the decisive factor, if he actually undertakes to attack the Russians one day, I am more than persuaded that he won’t allow Hungary to take part in a Russian victory over us. But, I repeat, we must be resolved to fight. The solution is to form a national government right away and to have the beast heading the state abdicate.” Lupu, Dinu Brătianu, and Ghiţă Pop congratulate me in turn, stating their accord with my views. We part without coming to an understanding. “Let’s wait for Mr. Maniu to see what more we can do,” Dinu Brătianu opines, closing the meeting. At 9 he is to meet with Dr. Angelescu and other Liberal front-benchers, and Lupu and his brother to dine with Malaxa[x]. I return home where C. Mihăilescu and the Giosanu family are waiting for me.
I appraise them of the discussions held at Dinu Brătianu’s and the resolution of the Privy Council but am not able to convince them that to accept the Russian ultimatum would be a big political mistake.
Giosanu sees the situation with the eyes of a military and is unmoved by my arguments that the Bulgarians and the Hungarians might not attack us. For a few days now my friend Mihăiescu[xi] has also started doubting Britain’s triumph. France’s shameful capitulation has considerably shaken his convictions, just like the fact that there is not a single French politician to take the initiative and form a government in Northern Africa and continue the war alongside Britain. For them, accepting the ultimatum is the only possible solution to our situation today. We part coldly. I am also very tired. I don’t listen to any radio station and I fall asleep like a log.
Friday, June 28, 1940
It is only today that I read yesterday’s papers which published the two pieces of news about Dinu Brătianu urging his political friends to join the National Party and about Mihalache’s resignation as royal counselor, which was accepted. The text of his resignation letter was not given though. From yesterday’s papers I also learn that de Gaulle organizes in London a legion of French volunteers.
At half past eight in the morning I go to Maniu’s who has just come back from Transylvania this night. I find Ghiţă Popa and Leucuţia there. They have already appraised him of what went on in the Privy Council and the note we and the Liberals have drawn up enjoining to a rejection of the ultimatum. I inform him of my talks with Madgearu, Sassu and Gh. Brătianu, which he appreciates. Maniu thinks the acceptance of the Soviet ultimatum is downright “criminal.” Ghiţă Pop and I accompany him to Mr. Lupu’s from there he calls Dinu Brătianu and sets an appointment at his place at 11. He will go with Lupu. At six in the afternoon we will meet at Mihai Popovici’s. Mihalache and Madgearu will also be there as they arrive during the day from Dobreşti.
I returned home to finish my preparations for the draft. We still do not have complete information on the things occurred and discussed in the Privy Council. There are all sorts of versions available. On my way home I drop shortly at C. Mihăilescu’s office. I find him talking to Georgescu-Cocoş, Serdici and Leon. Georgescu pretends Iorga declared for rejecting the Russian ultimatum and that now he too has become aware of the fact that a cabinet including Titulescu and Lupu should have been made up which could have reached an understanding with the Soviets. Georgescu also says that Iorga is angry with the King and Tătărescu for their policy of collaboration with the Iron Guard and with Germany. Leon and Serdici remind Georgescu how guilty Iorga too is of the present situation. “Iorga, my dears, has never been a politician in the true sense of the word.” [...]
At six we have a bureau meeting at Mihai Popovici’s, who has returned this afternoon from Govora where he is taking a water cure. All the members of the bureau are present. Mihalache and Popovici look down in the mouth. Madgearu makes great efforts to hold his head high. Lupu looks worried like on the eve of a parliamentary battle. Only Maniu is calm as usual but only God and I know what is going on in his heart. Ghiţă Pop and I keep quiet because, given the party hierarchy, the current situation cannot in any way be blamed on us. On the contrary! We two have done our utmost to support Maniu and his policy. Lupu, except for a few hesitations, has, in general, been with us. It is Mihalache, Popovici and Madgearu who are hugely to blame in our party, having permanently sabotaged Maniu.
Now they are reaping what they have sown. Lupu fulfils today the awkward role of censoring these mistakes. He asks to be allowed to speak right at the beginning of the meeting. For half an hour he hauls them big over the coals, reproaching them all faults they committed since the summer of 1936, since when we missed the single occasion we had to strike a deal with the Soviets. “You sabotaged the entire action Hudiţă and I have undertaken in the summer of 1936 in Paris, in full agreement with Titulescu[xii]. You thought I had created too strong a political platform and could be a peril for our friend Mihalache, for the policy of understanding with the Soviets. When we came back to the country you not only failed to help us to counter Stelian Popescu, who started his famous campaign against us and the Sărindar newspapers but you went so far as to encourage him on the q. t. Who benefited from all this scheming? [...] Carol who thus could rid himself of Titulescu and all the newspapers on Sărindar Street that supported our party’s policy and Titulescu. Everything Mr. Maniu and I have endeavored to do ever since in order to force Carol not to push the country into an understanding with Germany you two have thwarted under various pretexts; recently, our friend Mihalache even accepted to become counselor [...] and in agreement with his pals, Madgearu and Popovici, you were about to get enrolled in the totalitarian party of the beast, for several years pressing for an alliance with Hitler. Does the Soviets’ Ultimatum take you by surprise now? Ever since 1936 Litvinov warned us several times that the Soviets would not allow the Germans near the Dniester in any way and in any form. Now hold hands with Tătărescu and the whole gang of traitors around him and Carol, and assume responsibility for the disaster visited upon us!”
Addressing Maniu, Lupu continues thus: “And you, Mr. Maniu, bear part of the guilt because you failed to use your discretionary power to put us with the back to the wall and force us to sort out our attitudes, to follow you and the policy envisaged by you. Or to quit the party as others have done before. I recognize in all earnest my share of guilt. I shouldn’t have stayed put, satisfied with the idea that if most of the front-benchers do not agree then there is nothing for me to do. Thus I have remained indifferent to events that I know for sure are to the detriment of this country. We, Mr. Maniu, as politicians, are responsible before the nation not only for what we did and what we failed but also for what we knew to be good and did not undertake. I hope my three friends don’t feel hurt for what I have told them. We are witnessing events that are way too painful for this nation. The consciousness of responsibility burdens my shoulders because I failed to do what I should have done in order to spare the nation all these miseries. I ask my friends to embark on some soul searching now because we are all responsible before our poor nation that has trusted us all along whereas we failed to perform up to par!”
Friday, September 6, 1940
The Great Day! I slept miserably, two hours towards dawn at best. When I woke up at seven Ispasiu brought me the big news I had been expecting for ten years: The abdication [...] On the Radio they said he abdicated in favor of his son, Mihai, and that Antonescu[xiii] was charged with leading the nation! I dressed up in a hurry and rang home to tell them I was fine, and would be there in half an hour. When I got to my house all the radio sets on my street were broadcasting the tidings of Carol’s abdication and general Antonescu’s Appeal to the country [...]
The event is so amazing that I can hardly believe it. I have too long waited for it and often without too big hopes. Yet I can’t jubilate as much as I should have! I try to talk over the phone to my friends but I must wait a lot to be put through. After half past nine I give up for there’s no dialing tone any more. Too many people on line, commenting the event of the day, to be able to make any call.
By ten Costică Mihăiescu and Lupu show up with sweetmeats and a bottle a champagne, “to celebrate the abdication of the beast,” Lupu explains The three of us embrace, congratulate each other, and rejoice like kids around the Christmas tree filled with toys and glittering lights. A few moments we content ourselves with simple explanations: “What a great event”, “Good for Antonescu”, “Finally the country can breathe freely”, etc. “From now on the miseries visited on Romania will be easier to endure,” says Lupu. “We have to see what can be done about Transylvania and what Antonescu thinks about this matter.” Mihăiescu believes the situation could still be saved by stopping the evacuation of the other areas, and commanding our army to enter the region ceded yesterday.
We interrupt our conversation to listen to the latest news on the radio. At eight King Mihai was sworn in before patriarch Nicodim and the new chairman of the Court of Cassation, Gh. Lupu. Antonescu received full powers and the tile of Head of State. The 1938 Constitution was suspended. The ministers in the former cabinet keep their positions until the new government is formed. The law-making bodies have been dismantled. The King’s tasks are set by Decree. [...] General Dombrovski is dismissed from the post of mayor general of Bucharest. Colonel Ion Cameniţă is appointed general director of the State Security Department and police prefect of Bucharest. In his Appeal to the country, Antonescu declares that from today on “a new regime, not only a new government is instated” in the country. The formula comes as a surprise to us, and we wonder what he means by “a new regime”. From the radio we learn that Queen Elena, Mihai’s mother has been summoned to the country from Dresden where she was visiting. At a quarter to eleven we go to Maniu’s. Mihăiescu gives us a ride in his car.
All the members of the bureau are present plus Ionel Pop, Fănel Mihăiescu and Aurel Dobrescu, who also take part in our discussions. I found them commenting on Stelian Popescu’s article about Carol’s abdication, published in a special edition of the Universul newspaper, issued one hour before. Ghiţă Pop insists on reading it to us, first of all to take Madgearu, Mihalache and Popovici down a peg who, in various occasions showed willing to collaborate with Carol, and even enroll in the Nation Party. I shall reproduce it almost entirely because each line in this article is a slap on the face of these guys who today realize how right we were, Maniu, Lupu, Ghiţă Pop and I. At a given time we were about to lose Lupu who, luckily for him, quickly realized he would be making a wrong move.
Here is this article. “He who was Carol II abdicated. He who the future generations will remember as the biggest pestilence ever visited on Romania. Today, September 6, part of the ordeal this nation has suffered with resignation and manliness has come to an end with the abdication of this degenerate, landed on the throne of Romania. Carol Caraiman, (the new name he assumes from now on) the usurper of his son’s throne ten years ago, the Freemason and lover of the dissolute kike Lupescu brought over here to be the companion and inspiration of the degenerate [...] The rule of an alcoholic and amoral epileptic! For ten years we gnashed our teeth and put up with the endless row of dastardly knaves steering the State, all in tune, rapt in admiration at the simplest words of the sadist whose orders they carried out like the holy commandments. The canker has been rooted out! Lend every support to this providential man, general Antonescu…”
I for one accept every word in this article by Stelian Popescu, with only one reserve: “the support to be lent to Antonescu,” in case he carries out the Vienna Award provisions or wants us to wage war against the Soviets alongside Germany.
After reading the article I remember we had a brief discussion on the topic. Mihalache and Madgearu found it “too obnoxious”, saying that anyway Stelian Popescu wasn’t exactly the moral authority to assert such things. “He put on paper exactly what every single Romanian thinks,” Lupu replied. “As to the form it can be excused if we take into account how hated the beast is. Thank God we disposed of him! I suggest we congratulate Antonescu to have managed to rid the country of such an infamous character!”
We then passed to information. Every item was reviewed in turn. Popovici, Lupu, Mihalache and Madgearu remarked with considerable pleasure that Carol’s dictatorship had been removed and all the political cheats and frauds, beastly Carol’s accomplices, had been relegated. The four of them paid homage to Antonescu for this work of political cleansing. Lupu expressed a slight reserve though as to our future relations with Antonescu. “Everything he has done so far is perfect,” he said. “The nation ought to bear him eternal gratitude for having rid us of that fraud Carol, and all his minions, and for having eradicated his sinister dictatorship which cramped the country into the frontiers of today. Remains to be seen if after having escaped a dictatorship we will not enter another, just as dangerous, especially as Antonescu is resolved to play into the hands of the Germans, alongside with the other political dregs of this country, the Iron Guard and their henchmen. The fact that he has assumed the title of Leader of the State in my opinion smacks of dictatorship à la Hitler or Mussolini. This is what worries me now when we still ignore all the secrets that enabled him to rid us of [...] Carol.” “For all the judicious reserves of Mr. Lupu’s,” I said, “I agree to all the praises sung to Antonescu; still, I too am afraid we don’t end up in the German camp, if the fact turns out to be true that Fabricius[xiv] helped him and he’s been in cahoots with him for quite a time.” “I also have the same reserves as Messrs. Lupu and Hudiţă,” Ghiţă Pop declared.
Maniu spoke last. He began by saying that indeed Antonescu had done “a very good job for which we have to be grateful” but then he continued: “The reserves expressed by Messrs. Lupu and Hudiţă are the more grounded as we have all the reasons in the world to believe that his progress was achieved with Germany’s help, which implies huge difficulties in the future.” “Someone very well placed and therefore likely to know everything that happened at the palace during the night,” Maniu continued, “told me at 10 that things in connection with Carol’s abdication and Antonescu’s appointment as Leader of the State stood completely in a different way than presented by the communiqués. It was not a matter of abdication but of downright dethronement. Therefore only when we learn the whole truth about this event will we be able to make a final judgment and find out in what direction we are heading. One thing is certain, anyway: Antonescu did not keep the pledge made before Brătianu and I, that is to refuse all solution that was not based on Carol’s abdication and the formation of a national government headed by me, and Dinu Brătianu as foreign minister. The fact that he has accepted to become Leader of the State, cutting all connection with Mr. Brătianu and I, is an indication that he availed himself of our political and moral authority for a personal end. It is appropriate therefore to wonder who he relies on when he plays such a bold game. In a day or two we’ll find that out, most likely. Until then I ask you to be cautious and reserved in your relations with him until we learn his purpose and with whom he intends to collaborate.”
Saturday, September 14, 1940
I see Maniu at half past eight in the morning. He arrived last night from Transylvania. He decided to cancel the great demonstration at Alba Iulia in order to avoid inevitable disorders caused by the Romanian population’s deep discontent. All the roads were busy with huge convoys of carts, chariots, cars and trucks filled with people seeking haven after Transylvania had been ceded to the Hungarians. “There’s so much pain in the hearts of these people,” Maniu opines, “that we must avoid their meeting in too big numbers lest they allow themselves to be carried away by their despair and demand the annulment of the 1918 Union to the Older Kingdom. The moment I learnt that many of these refugees reproach the Older Kingdom to have deceived and forsaken them, letting them at the discretion of the Hungarians – therefore they now want to sever all ties with Bucharest – I realized that holding such a big meeting at Alba Iulia in this kind of atmosphere is wrought with perils.”
Maniu does not believe a single word of what Antonescu said in the three communiqués referring to the conditions of the abdication. Today he entreaties me to go and see him and, in his name, ask him for the truth on the matter. At ten he leaves with a car, going to Madgearu’s vineyard where he will meet Mihalache at lunch. He says that I should drop by David Popescu’s[xv] since, according to his information, Antonescu will publish the list of the new government today or tomorrow. Maniu is resolute not to come in direct contact with Antonescu “because of the shameful manner in which he went back on the word he gave him.” He wants to see what cabinet he scrapes together and only then will he set a course of action for our party in connection with him and his policy. Maniu does not take seriously Hitler’s threats at Britain and is convinced he will be defeated.
Sunday, September 15, 1940
I see in the papers that King Mihai was promoted to the rank of brigadier general. Lieutenant-colonel Dămăceanu, my former colleague in the graduation examination of 1915 (the graduates of the Boarding High School of Iaşi defended their school-leaving papers alongside us, the students of the National High School) is appointed royal adjutant, while major Mircea Tomescu aide-de-camp. At the same time the resignation is announced of Mrs. Gusti, née Militineau, a Jew and a cousin of Mrs. Lupescu! I read in the Universul a long interview granted by old Zelea Codreanu of the Iron Guard, a little wooly and confuse like his mind. Anyway, the cabinet lined up by Antonescu has a strong Iron Guard whiff although there are some non-legionaries among them, such as Leon, Mareş, Cretzianu, and Mihai Antonescu[xvi] but these too are great Jerry-lovers.
Radio London itself announces that the other night the Germans heavily bombed the British capital, losing, nonetheless, 300 planes. Two or three more clashes like this, and Hitler will be left wingless, whereas Britain can get seriously supplied by the United States!
Thursday, October 15, 1940
Today, in the half-hour break at 11, I talked foreign policy with my colleagues for the first time. None of them contradicted my theory that Britain could not be defeated and that we shouldn’t act in solidarity with tomorrow’s vanquished. They looked at me unbelievingly. Fear of the Iron Guard and of Antonescu forced them to be cautious. When I explained that I was in politics with Maniu they realized they had no reason to fear me. Naum, the Latin teacher told me – when there were only the two of us left – that he too agreed with the fact that Hitler would lose the war.
In the evening I listen to Radio London and Radio Rome. After having insinuated for days on end that Britain would have proposed peace to Hitler via Spain, the Italian and German newspapers are hard pressed how to side-step the issue and get away with it, as everybody can see they lied like troopers. Britain is more resolved than ever to go on with the war until the total annihilation of Hitler and Mussolini.
In the papers I also read that Tătărescu’s house arrest has been revoked. I don’t understand what Antonescu meant by setting free the biggest of Carol’s knaves, responsible before the country for almost all of Carol’s dirty actions. I wonder if he does not intend to use Carol’s proxies as tools to neutralize Maniu and his policy. Little by little, Antonescu will get compromised and Maniu will be proved to be right. He has long said that his man is a fickle, ambitious, cunning and characterless man. The other days Lupu told me that Mihai Antonescu, until yesterday in Gh. Brătianu’s party, wants to go it alone and is scheming against Gh. Brătianu in order to thwart any possible collaboration with general Antonescu. Seems Lupu is right and this explains why Mihai Antonescu has a keen interest in having Tătărescu free. New people with old habits!
Wednesday, October 16, 1940
Held up all day with examinations I could not take part in the proceedings for the setting up of the Pro Transilvania Society that elected Maniu chairman and Ghiţă Pop secretary-general. I am on the leading board though, having arranged it over the phone with Maniu. The Universul daily did not publish all the names of the board. Lugosianu, who cannot stand me because I oppose his being readmitted into the party, sees to it, whenever he can that my name be not printed in his paper! Dining at Mihai Popovici’s, I bark at him like mad when he tries to justify Carol’s foreign policy of rapprochement towards Italy and Germany.
I had exams all day with a short break between 3 and 5, and then I barely found the time to leaf through the newspapers. Two more days and the examinations are over!
The campaign led by our press against Hungary on the matter of the mistreatment of the Romanians in ceded Transylvania continues just as virulently. Even Sima[xvii] protested at Braşov in a meeting of the Iron Guard against the persecutions and terrible crimes. “Romania does not complain,” he stated, “and does not respond to the provocation but it is good to know there is a limit to the patience and dignity of a state.” That’s how it should be had the Iron Guard represented our nation and not a gang of traitors on the payroll of Germany! Who do they think they fool with such empty words, deprived of all sincerity? That among them there are many honest but naïve youths that’s for sure, but what good does it do if they don’t play a more prominent role in the party leadership which is in the hands of scum and frauds.
I read in the papers that they have even set up an Iron Guard “judgment council” made up of five members – chairman, Corneliu Georgescu, president of the Annunciation Organization, members C. Papanace, C. Stoicănescu, D. Groza and Mihai Apostoleanu. Nobody knows what they represent and if they are trained for such posts. The defendants brought before this forum will speak in their own defense, no attorneys, as Iron Guard ethics requires. They are talking about ethics and morals, they who shamelessly pillage and commit assassinations throughout the country! This is who Antonescu has associated with “to organize the new country, beautiful like the sun in the sky!” After all, it is beastly Carol who, out of hate for Maniu is responsible for taking revenge on the country by bringing to power these miserable.
While Antonescu sets Tătărescu free, the Iron Guard have turned the house of Madam Lupescu into a place of pilgrimage so that everybody can see how Carol’s mistress lived. But on whom did Carol and his bunch rely if not on Tătărescu and the dregs of the Romanian political world, exhilarated to be able to frequent the salon of the celebrate royal cocotte!
Friday, November 22, 1940
The bureau meeting is held at five in the afternoon at Mihai Popovici’s, Mihalache being present too. In the morning, Madgearu worked with Maniu on the memorandum to be sent to Antonescu. At noon Maniu met with Dinu Brătianu who agreed to forward a similar statement. This memorandum resumes our well-known foreign policy and reproaches Antonescu the big mistake of having tied Romania to regimes “detested by the whole civilized world and destined to soon vanish!” “The National Peasant Party, as a representative of the great majority of the Romanian people, declares one more time that your regime, general, is a dictatorship, continuing the royal one, which does not have the approval of the country. Consequently your acts, just like those of the former regime, do not engage the Romanian people which is, in its heart and soul, close to its natural allies and not to those who imposed on us the hateful Vienna Award, and agreed in a secret accord that the Soviets occupy Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina.” The memorandum asks, in conclusion, for free elections that will clearly show that “not even 10% of the Romanian population is agreeable to our joining the Tripartite Pact!” Lupu proposes the proportion of 10% be reduced to 3% as, he maintains, “joining the Tripartite Pact means waging war on Hitler’s side, and the Romanian people won’t hear about such a partnership.” Lupu’s suggestion is accepted. Mihalache declares himself in favor and recommends that the memorandum be signed by all the members of the bureau, which is accepted without any opposition.
The domestic situation is then addressed. Mihalache and Madgearu complain they receive every day all sorts of threats from the Iron Guard, inviting them to stop “running counter the country’s will and join those who want to rid us of the Bolsheviks!” It is on account of these claims, that the Iron Guard represents the will of the country, – that we put in our memorandum the phrase about the free elections. “They want to test the country’s wishes, let’s have free elections and then they’ll get the kick in the back that they deserve from the electorate!”
Popovici and Ghiţă Pop speak about the anarchy in the country fanned by the Iron Guard police. Popovici says that on the Bucharest-Braşov road gangs of the so-called Iron Guard police stop and check all the cars and confiscate everything they lay their hands on, even clothes, without providing any explanation or written evidence of the goods seized. Highway robbery! At times, some of these Iron Guard brigands in uniforms declare to the victims that their stuff and money are confiscated for the “Iron Guard fund” to help those affected by the earthquake! Mihalache and Madgearu declare they will write a letter to Antonescu and denounce all these highway thefts perpetrated by the Iron Guard, his political allies.
Saturday, November 23, 1940
King Boris of Bulgaria went to Germany too. I am curious if he joins the Tripartite Pact since the Soviets could deem this an act of treason by Bulgaria. According to Radio Berlin, Antonescu was very well received in Germany. Romania’s joining the Tripartite Pact, today, November 23, is given as sure. Slovakia is also expected to adhere. Antonescu is accompanied by foreign minister Sturdza and several Iron Guard members, among whom P. P. Panaitescu, Al. Constant and others.
In the country, there is considerable hubbub in the Iron Guard world in connection with the disinterring of the remains of Corneliu Codreanu and of the ten Iron Guardists who killed dissident legionary Mihail Stelescu. Big demonstrations are prepared for the occasion. People fear lest all kinds of massacres should take place during these events. I see Lupu at 11. Ghiţă Pop is here too. Maniu is away, having left for Transylvania where he goes very often. We talk about the measures to be taken by our organization in Bucharest to prevent possible Iron Guard raids. It has been decided to convene the heads of the four district organizations this afternoon at 5 in connection with the respective measures.
Lupu, in his quality as president of the capital organization is resolved to resort to Titel Petrescu’s socialists. Why not the communists too, I wonder? “Because,” Lupu replies, “ever since the proclamation of the Iron Guard State these gentlemen have proven so brave that they all went into hiding, and one ignores where to look for them. There is no trace of Pătrăşcanu, Constantinescu-Iaşi, Mihăileni, Joja, who before used to come to my place very often but now have simply vanished.” “Fine pieces of fighters,” Ghiţă Pop remarks. I tell them neither I have received any of their visits, and Ghiţă Pop informs us that about ten days before he received a letter from Petru Groza[xviii] announcing him that he for one found our alliance with Hitler unavoidable: “The only man who can help us get the Russian swine out of Bessarabia and Bukovina.” Ghiţă Pop adds that Maniu has always thought Groza to be unreliable, without character, not a man of his word, a sinister adventurer ready to serve whoever pays him. “Of all the so-called left-wing persons,” Lupu adds, “this Groza is one of the most heinous scoundrel I have ever known. Maniu is perfectly right, he’s a sinister reprobate, an adventurer, a sort of Don Quixote.”
In the evening we are invited to the Mihăilescu’s, together with the Zimţea family and colonel Mişu Marinescu. Their information coincides on two points: the anarchy and the disorder sown by the Iron Guard in the capital and the rest of the country have reached a climax, and confidence in Antonescu is growing with the public opinion. People see Antonescu and the army as the only safeguards against the Iron Guard’s debauchery. Colonel Marinescu maintains, based on solid data, that our officers “with very rare exceptions” are favorable to the alliance with Germany because of the great hostility against the Soviets”. He also says that the General Staff Headquarters and the Ministry of the Interior have reliable information on the Russians’ intention to occupy Moldavia. “If they haven’t done it already it’s because they fear the Germans. It’s very possible that Molotov may have tried in Berlin to put out feelers and see if Hitler might agree to close his eyes on this new Russian aggression against us. As long as he accepted that they occupied Bessarabia and Bukovina why wouldn’t he cede them the rest of Moldavia between the river Prut and the Carpathians? The Soviets would thus create a new Soviet republic, called the Moldavian Republic.” Mihăilescu and Zimţea declare they too have heard about this in their circles, showing that the Soviets have concentrated big forces in southern Bessarabia and in northern Bukovina. I reply that the occupation of the whole of Moldavia would further consolidate Russia’s position at the mouths of the Danube and this the German Reich would hate. “Anyway,” Zimţea opines, “no matter what the truth may be, our military circles are seriously afraid of the Russians and they perceive the Germans as a precious ally.”
Mihăilescu has information from the legionary circles that the approval to arrest the principal criminals of the Iron Guard leaders was “extracted with the tongs” from Antonescu before he left for Germany. All 32 were placed in the Jilava prison pending a trial. Among them there are also Gavril Marinescu, Victor Iamandi, colonel Zeciu, general Bengliu, etc. Ostensibly, Sima and Antonescu take issue as to the punishment. The former demands the death penalty while the latter is against it as he believes that all of them, being military, committed the crimes on order from the King and of the head of the government. Marinescu implies that this rift between Antonescu and Sima is something certain.
Tuesday, November 26, 1940
Today, between 10 and 12, I held two classes at the Archives School I got home at half past twelve, in the company of Emil Vîrtosu who lives close to my place, on Claudian Street. He says that the Russians stationed numerous troops in front of Galaţi and all day they have shooting drills on the bank of the Prut. We have two infantry divisions plus one of artillery pitted against them and in full alert day and night. Vîrtosu’s family from Galaţi is all packed to flee to Bucharest when they hear the first shot.
Round one Ghiţă Pop calls me up and says that Maniu returned from Braşov at 11. H also asks me to drop by him this evening at six. He recommends I show caution and if possible I take a taxi, not the tram. “There is a little bit of unrest downtown caused by the fact that today they started disinterring the remains of C. Codreanu and the three Nicadors[xix] at Jilava.” He phoned Lupu too and advised him to keep indoors and not to let anyone in. My impression is he exaggerates unless he has information that he cannot communicate over the phone.
Round 5, when I make ready to leave for Maniu’s place, Costache Lupu calls and tells me that Madgearu was invited at noon by a group of legionaries to accompany them to the Police Prefect’s Office to make a statement and that he hasn’t returned home since. He comes in his car to take me to Maniu. Lupu is also here, in the company of Leon and Serdici. Maniu is not home. He left word that we should wait for him until he returns from Mrs. Madgearu’s where he was invited to go at once at five. There are two stories about this: one is that he has been detained at the Police Prefect’s Office and the other that he has been killed by the Iron Guard this very afternoon.
We wait for Maniu to bring us tidings. The atmosphere is tense. Everyone present mentions all sorts of horrible things about the Iron Guard that spreads terror in the city and throughout the country. Negrei, Hoisescu, Cezar Simionescu, Dr. Stanculescu recount scenes they saw with their own eyes when gangs of legionaries ransacked Jewish stores, robbing and mauling their owners. “There is no more public order,” Serdici exclaims, “you cannot find a street sergeant anywhere as they are afraid or they are accomplices of these gangs.” “Trucks loaded with uniformed legionaries,” Cezar Simionescu shows, “cross the commercial and the Jewish centers of Văcăreşti and Dudeşti. They loot stores and shoot whoever resists them. They cry out loud that this is the legionaries’ revenge and that such is the express order of the Nicadors and of the Captain.
The general impression is that Antonescu cannot put up with this riotous excesses which seriously tarnish the prestige of his governance. Lupu is persuaded that “Antonescu is simply rabid about the behavior of his collaborators, the legionaries, and a boisterous divorce is expected.”
By seven Maniu, hot under the collar, gets here. In deathlike silence we all listen to his information about what has happened. “The moment he wanted to sit down at the table,” Maniu began, “three uniformed legionaries rang at door and Madgearu opened and asked them what they wanted. (Mrs. Madgearu was also present and she had attended the whole conversation. She was the one who later told Maniu what had happened.) Very politely, they asked him to accompany them to the Police Prefect’s Office to make a statement, after which in an hour at the most he would be brought back home. Madgearu did not say “no” but took his coat and followed them. After three hours, seeing that he still hadn’t come back, Mrs. Madgearu, worried, phoned the Police Prefect’s Office. They told her they knew nothing about such an invitation but they would make inquiries right away and then get back to her. By five, a commissar showed up at Mrs. Madgearu’s house and informed her that her husband had been found shot to death in the Snagov woods. The state bodies started investigating the case in order to identify and arrest the assassins. Mrs. Madgearu called Maniu right away and he went to the Council of Ministers at five, the Ministry of Justice and the Police Prefect’s Office where they assured him ‘that the assassins will be arrested as soon as possible and severely punished.”
There follow the comments of the persons present. Maniu seems tired and incensed. Lupu is silent and looks moodily out of the study window. Mihai Popovici and then Ionel Pop show up in this glacial atmosphere. Ghiţă Pop, instead of Maniu, assumes the task of informing him of the events. “A terrible situation,” is all that Popovici says, stopping short and going to the window, next to Lupu. Seeing that no one takes the floor, I venture to comment on this tragedy. The moment I start to speak Ion Răducanu walks in, eager to learn details about the assassination of Madgearu, his colleague at the Academy of Commerce and his good friend. After appraising him of what I learnt from Maniu I continue my commentary on the heinous murder.
Răducanu is the first to attempt an explanation of Madgearu’s assassination: namely that he had many enemies among his students at the Academy of Commerce who availed themselves of the hectic atmosphere in the Capital to get revenge. “Madgearu,” Răducanu explains, “was a very good professor but also harsh and always treated them as ‘Iron Guard hoodlums’. I often drew his attention he had to be cautious and not antagonize those hooligans you find galore at the Academy. Madgearu never took seriously the threats of those thugs and now we have come to this.”
After Răducanu’s intervention I continued my observations. “I am persuaded,” I said, “that Antonescu can in no way accept these crimes and that he will act against the assassins. We must wait a day or two, to see how he reacts and the attitude of the Iron Guard leaders. If this is proven to have been personal revenge, we will try to see the guilty ones put to trial and sentenced according to the laws in force. If he was murdered with the connivance of the Iron Guard leadership or at the instigation of the Germans, which cannot be ruled out, then we will have to take adequate steps. For the moment we have to gather information and wait for the measures the Government will take.”
In the evening I read the daily papers and listen to Radio London. Antonescu declared on his return from Germany that he was very glad of the welcome he had been given. “I come back to the country,” he stated, “bringing the trust of the Fuhrer and of the German people. Romania will gain her rights.” From all his public declarations and especially from his private talks Antonescu let us infer that he was assured of the cancellation of the Vienna Award. I ignore whether this is merely propagandistic bragging, but in case these pledges were real Antonescu as head of the State ought to be more discreet.
The intensity of the German air raids over Britain has diminished a lot. In exchange, the British aviation is ever more active in northern Africa, on the Greek-Italian and the German front. The industrial centers and ports in Germany garner special attention from the British aviators. American-Japanese tension is mounting, just like the concern of the Soviets because, according to the press, Molotov did not return with any guarantees from Hitler. More, he came back downright disappointed. No wonder! I too have started to believe that since Hitler has become convinced that he cannot defeat Britain by way of the arms he has no other solution than to assault the Soviets, hoping he will find the economic resources if greatly lacks and that by doing away with the Bolsheviks he will be able to strike a deal with the British-American bourgeoisie more easily.
Wednesday, November 27, 1940
At seven I got a phone call from Chirnoagă. He asked me to drop by the Ministry at 8 where I could find P. P. Panaitescu too as they had something to tell me. For a moment I thought of not going in token of protest at Madgearu’s assassination but I quickly realized that would be mistake. And when I saw them I felt persuaded that I did the right thing. I talked to them in Făcăoaru’s office. Besides Panaitescu and Chirnoagă, Băncilă, higher education director, and my friend Găzdaru were also present. Chirnoagă was the first to speak, lambasting against the “dirty murder” of Madgearu. He then said that the perpetrators of the assassination “are trash somehow ganged together in the Iron Guard, a movement that has nothing to do with such hooligans who kill an intellectual for personal vengeance. He is sure that the perpetrators of this crime must be some good-for-nothing students of his who flunked his exams.” Panaitescu completely agreed to what Chirnoagă said. He also informed me that the other night a delegation on which they too stood, went to Antonescu to ask him to arrest the perpetrators and send them to justice since the Iron Guard could not be solidary with such criminals. Chirnoagă told me that Antonescu was just as inflamed as he and the other members of the delegation, among whom Sima too, and following the discussions held a communiqué was issued in which Antonescu, the Government and the Iron Guard categorically condemned not only Madgearu’s assassination but any act of personal revenge other than by way of justice.
“Today at noon,” Chirnoagă continued, “we’ll meet with Antonescu again to see what measures have to be taken to catch and punish exemplarily the bandits who last night murdered several political detainees at Jilava prison.” Now he found about this new and more terrible crime. Panaitescu, seemingly the best informed, believed some 30 persons were killed, supposedly “guilty of the crimes against the Captain and the Nicadors”. Among them, they thought, there were generals Argeşanu, Bengliu, and Gavrilă Marinescu, colonel Zeciu, magistrate Pascu, Victor Iamandi, and others. Făcăoaru and Băncilă tried to defend the criminals, invoking the “state of spirit of the legionaries who for two days have been disinterring the remains of the captain and the Nicadors in the yard of the Jilava prison and were terrified at the beastly manner in which they had been killed and buried. All sorts of chemicals had been tossed on them to make impossible any identification of the bodies.” Băncilă added that on top of the tomb a thick cement slab was poured as to make impossible any future disinterring. “Those people could no longer control their indignation,” Băncilă went on, “they stopped work and went inside the jail, shooting the authors of those assassinations.” “Even if that was so,” Chirnoagă chimed in, “they still cannot be excused for the murder perpetrated. We are an orderly state, and justice must be allowed to do its duty. The most serious thing about this crime is that the individuals who committed it are outsiders, people who did not take part in the digs and who came with weapons and cars, which presupposed more accomplices and perfect premeditation.” Găzdaru, who had not said one word, declared he saw eye to eye with Chirnoagă, while the others remained quiet, meaning they did not approve his words. “We must have the courage to admit openly that these murders are a terrible stain on our government and the entire Iron Guard Movement. Under the circumstances, I don’t see how we can go on ruling the country given that we cannot keep the order and safeguard people’s life,” Găzdaru concluded, in perfect agreement with Chirnoagă. I found Panaitescu’s silence quite dubious as he avoided condemning the Jilava murders.
Maniu drew the conclusion that “all these crimes have condemned the Iron Guard state for good and Antonescu too. To save face,” Maniu continued, “he has no other solution than to part with the Iron Guard Movement and finish the legionary state as soon as possible.”
Tuesday, January 21, 1941
At our Club on Clémenceau Street a 50-strong young detachment stood guard, all armed to the teeth. Equally, at the four headquarters of the Colors there is a guard made up of 25 armed young men. We parted at half past five in an atmosphere of extreme enthusiasm. Lupu, accompanied by Costache and other friends went to professor Lupu on Dacia Boulevard. I left with a car from Mihăiescu’s garage to see what was going on back home. I found my folks perfectly calm. Neculai went downtown in the afternoon. He said that there were army guards posted all along Victoriei Road, from the Police Prefect’s Office down to the Royal Palace. No car passed by. He found out from the people on the sidewalks that the Police Prefect’s Office and the National Theater were surrounded by troops and from time to time they bandied shots with the legionaries barricaded inside.
I stayed home some thirty minutes. At seven I was on Dacia Boulevard, driving slowly in the light of the car. The entire Vatra Luminoasă district was plunged in darkness. All along the Mihai Bravu Avenue the same situation, from Vatra Luminoasă to Lizeanu. When we rode past the Obor area we heard all sorts of cries and shouts, the noise of windows being broken, most likely of Jewish shops. Gangs of thieves swarmed all over the place carrying sacks on their backs. No trace of a single street sergeant. The city was left at the mercy of the crews of thieves and Gypsies. Were there legionaries among them too? Who knows? Cloaked in darkness, any criminal can do what he fancies. From Lizeanu we went down Viitorului Street, to Gemeni Market and Dacia Boulevard. No light, no taxi all the way. Here and there a hurried passer-by, walking briskly home. We got to Lupu’s place with a heavy heart. Even driver Dumbravă was terrified of what we had seen on the way. I told him not to take the car to the garage, I would vouch for it, and to go straight home, on Tunari Street.
Nedelcu, who had also gone to see his folks returned at a little past eight, coming from Spirei Hill. No tramway had been running since early afternoon. He too has met with all sorts of gangs breaking into and looting Jewish shops.
“The prestige of the Antonescu rule is dead and gone,” Lupu said, “no matter what he will claim in the coming days.” “If he had any brains,” professor Lupu added, “he will reign as soon as order is reestablished and handle the power to Maniu. That’s what I’d do if I were in his place.” “He’s too ambitious and proud to do so it,” I remarked.
We found ourselves completely isolated. The telephones were out of order. Shots and like an artillery raid could be heard from the Council sheltering Antonescu. Behind the Presidency there stood the garrison of public guards which, the night before, had been taken by more than one thousand armed legionaries. Cezar Simionescu told us that in the morning Antonescu concentrated numerous troops around the Presidency. Among them there were some artillery and assault units. Costache Lupu wondered if Antonescu was able to resist and if, in the end, he would not withdraw in order to avoid any bloodshed. “He will never do such a thing,” I explained to Lupu. “Because besides being ambitious and megalomaniac he is also very mean and revengeful. To the extent he can, he will order the troops to shoot no matter the size of the carnage!”
We took turns at keeping watch until two when Lupu, his brothers and I went to sleep. (I all dressed up!)
Wednesday, January 22, 1941
The rebellion is at its height. I go home in C. Mihăiescu’s car to see how my family spent the night. Everything is all right. The neighborhood is quiet. My brothers always sleep at my place. From Dacia Boulevard down to my home I saw very few people in the streets. Not a single sergeant or police officer. The shops in the Mihai Bravu and Obor area look terrible. Their windows are broken, their wares have vanished and the few passers-by hurry past them, not even daring take a closer look. The gangs of hoodlums have been here! Were there legionaries among them? This we will learn later. All the stores that have survived the disaster are closed…By 9 I leave my home and return to Dacia Boulevard on another road. I’ll stay there this night, too. At half past nine, I drop by C. Mihăiescu’s, and at 10 at the Club on Clémenceau.
I gather the first information about the rebellion from C. Mihăiescu. Judging by the agitation in the Ambassador Hotel where the officers of the German Mission are stationed, he fears the German army in Bucharest and in the neighborhood could intervene in favor of the Iron Guard today. In the Jewish districts of Călăraşi, Dudeşti and Lipscani gangs of legionaries and thugs ransacked most of the shops and killed a big number of Jews. Nobody knows for sure the scope of these horrors since from yesterday afternoon there is no more public order in the city. “The police commissars and the day guards,” Mihăiescu explains, “have all vanished into thin air, some being Iron Guard sympathizers, others just saving their bacon, not knowing who will get the upper hand eventually.” There is rumor that young Jews in several districts have taken up arms and are staying guard in certain streets. Bungeţeanu told him that an hour ago negotiations started between Antonescu and Sima to reach an understanding, but “there are poor chances to succeed.” Mihăiescu has reliable information from the legionary camp that Sima and his friends in the leadership are very uneasy about the fact that the army actually carries out Antonescu’s orders, and the German troops hesitate to come to their rescue. “In fact,” he continued, “Sima is no longer in control of the rebellious leaders of the Movement who are firmly resolved to go on with the fight until the final split with Antonescu.” By this time, 9:30 in the morning, nobody knows anything certain as to what will happen in the provinces.
All is in order at the Club on Clémenceau Street. The young people who kept vigil last night stayed in permanent contact with their families downtown. They are familiar with the news provided by Mihăiescu in connection with the anarchy and disorder in the Jewish quarters. They are convinced that the army stands by Antonescu and that the Iron Guard Rebellion will be quashed. All these tidings make a very good impression on Lupu who arrives here at 11. The moment I walk on the door shots and shell explosions can be heard from the Presidency of the Council. Like on the front, during the war, Costache Lupu is persuaded that “the fight is in the final stage and in a matter of hours it will be over.” Lupu avoids making any commentary. He is happy our youth guards at the Club have a good morale and he admits frankly that “we made a huge mistake on September 6, last year not to have strongly opposed Antonescu’s ascent to power. “All of us who did not support Maniu then and went out in the street,” continues Lupu, “are responsible for the tragic events of today.” I congratulate him for the honesty with which he admitted something I have been maintaining for a long time.
At one I meet with Ghiţă Pop at the Club on Clémenceau Street. He has not slept home for three days. We exchange information. The phones are still out of order and we simply cannot find out what is going on in the provinces. We are glad to learn that the legionaries haven’t attacked any of our headquarters in Bucharest. “The time has not yet come,” Ghiţă Pop opines. “Let them take the power and you will see the trouble they’ll give us in order to humor the Germans.” “Let’s hope that Antonescu beats them and we are rid of such miseries,” I replied. “Anyway, even if coming out triumphant, Antonescu has lost a good part of his prestige, both before Hitler and especially before the country since he has been compelled to gun down his own collaborators, the people he himself sided with.” “Perhaps there is something good for us in of this tragedy,” I continued, “as the minority that tries to play the game of the Germans has not disarmed, getting stained and covered in shame and the disdain of the nation. From now on, Antonescu will no longer have the courage or the necessary authority to fight us. Every cloud has a silver lining.”
Ghiţă Pop is delighted with my conclusions.
I have lunch at home. I read the newspapers, that came out quite irregularly these days. Some papers, like the Universul for example, have not published any issue. Not even the Iron Guard press has been out normally, except Cuvântul [The Word]. This prints Sima’s address to the legionaries on the front page, in capital letters. “The worst persecution has started again. Steel your hearts and fill them with resolution in the heavy and just clash in which you became engaged and from which we are ordered to come out triumphant or dead. I am thinking of you as I write. Of you who will have to die, receiving the baptism of death with the calm of our Thracian ancestors. And of you, who will have to tread over the dead and their graves carrying in your arms the valiant banners of the Romanians.”
In the evening we comment together with Lupu the article written by P. P. Panaitescu who surprises even myself by the virulence of the attack against Antonescu, and the complete lack of good faith. “It’s a shame,” opines Lupu, “that a university professor, and a rector at that, has signed such a piece.” It is printed on the first page of today’s Cuvântul, right after Sima’s order. “Why are the legionaries shot at?” Panaitescu, who is part of the conspiracy against Antonescu, asks rhetorically. “Who is interested in not seeing published the material found in the Freemasons’ lodge? Who is interested in not seeing the minister of the interior (general Petrovicescu) tied to the Iron Guard Movement? Who is interested not to have words of friendship for Germany and Italy spread throughout the country? The answer is but one: Britain, the haven and prop of the Freemasons, the enemy of the Iron Guard, and of national socialism and fascism. It is the proxies of Britain, of the Freemason, of the old regime that have engineered these deeds.”
What shocks us most is the meanness and ill-faith of these bandits. On order from Captain Sima, the leadership of Cuvântul newspaper also publishes a sort of communiqué: “The nation is committing suicide!” Here are some excerpts. “For 48 hours the country’s army has been gunning and threshing down the legionary crop. For 48 hours the children of the nation, dressed in the country’s uniform, have been massacring the sons of the same Romanian kin, attired in green shirts. Scheming and plotting by enemies of the Romanian nation’s revival have pushed part of the country’s army against the Iron Guard youths. Blood is being shed! The schemers make merry in the shadows! Soldiers of the country… do not play into the hands of the foes of the Romanian spirit, of Christianity, in the hands of the minions of criminal Britain. Stop! There, the army of Transylvania, torn away from the country, has come to the side of the legionaries, of the nation. From the city of Iaşi, the city of national battles, general Coroamă has set out at the head of the 4th Army Corps to come to the support of the Iron Guard. From Braşov, general Dragalina is speeding to Bucharest. The aviation group of Tecuci has embraced our cause. The army and the marines of Constanţa are on our side. Almost the whole army of Oltenia has joined us. Officers and soldiers…For whose sake should we commit suicide? For the sake of a few rascals and a handful of women in the service of our eternal enemy? Too long have we wondered lost! Start the big battle, the battle for freedom and the healing of the Romanian nation fallen slave to robbers and bitches.” By bitches, the Iron Guard means Madam Antonescu, Madam Goga, and Madam Barbu whom they have been malingering for a couple of weeks.
By 5 I was at Lupu’s on Dacia Boulevard where I stayed overnight. Together with him we read the communiqué of the Presidency of the Council referring to the replacement of Petrovicescu by general Dumitru Popescu. Instead of general D. Popescu general Sănătescu was appointed military commander of the capital. “General Petrovicescu was replaced,” reads the communiqué “to strengthen interior order which lately required fresh measures of peace and authority to stop the acts of anarchy, the taking possession illegally of other people’s goods, all this leading to economic disorder…because nine hours after the assassination of a German officer, general Petrovicescu failed to take any measure and did not place a guard at the headquarters of the German Mission.” In today’s newspapers we also learnt that the economic general staff of the Iron Guard Movement also included Mihail Manoilescu, Octav Onicescu, Dan Rădulescu, etc. Lupu burst out violently against this scum of the earth, these lavatories of parties who, after having helped Carol to skeletonize the Iron Guard Movement and kill its Captain have now found a cozy place inside this Movement. “These dastardly traitors,” Lupu went on, “must be punished even more seriously than those miserable legionaries who are less to blame than them, being mere incognizant simpletons.”
We listened to Radio London, Rome and Berlin until late in the night. Nothing special. The German aviation considerably lessened its attacks on Britain, the Italians went from defeat to defeat in Africa and on the Balkan front, the United States kept on getting armed while the tension with Japan continued to grow.
Thursday, January 23, 1941
Disorder and anarchy spread throughout the night. After a short visit home between half past seven and eight in the morning I dropped by C. Mihăiescu’s office near Hotel Ambassador, at nine. Being stationed at the core of the capital and keeping up good relations with the legionaries and various officers of the German Mission accommodated in this hotel, Mihăiescu is our best informer in these difficult days for the country. I learn from him that yesterday afternoon, after general C. Sănătescu took up his new position, the army received order to take by force all the buildings occupied by legionaries: the barracks of public guards behind the Presidency of the Council, the National Theater, the Iron Guard headquarters on Roma Street and Vulpache Alley, the Telephone Building. There was only the Police Prefect Office’s left where legionaries barricaded themselves, at the head with Groza, Iaşinschi and Al. Ghica, the former police prefect who refused to obey Antonescu’s order.
The army fired a the legionaries from everywhere, and these retorted by killing a big number of soldiers. In front of the Presidency of the Council the legionaries poured petrol on a few wounded soldiers and set them on fire. Last night at five when evening set in the army ceased fire at the Police Prefect’s Office not to endanger the soldiers, as the legionaries shot from behind the walls. The army surrounded the building from everywhere and is awaiting for those encircled to surrender. Mihăiescu knew that Neubacher[xx] would have intervened during the night in order to find a means of understanding between Sima and Antonescu but he was not sure of the outcome. Round eight in the morning a German officer told him that at five in the morning Sima had ordered the rebellious legionaries in the capital and the rest of the country to stop fighting immediately and surrender. The rebels in the Police Prefect’s Office refused to submit to his command. As of this morning at half past seven phones have become operational again. By noon all the lines cut or blocked by the rebels will be in working order.
Armed with this information I went to Lupu’s, on Dacia Boulevard. There I found a special edition of the newspaper Cuvântul printing Sima’s order to the legionaries to stop fighting everywhere in the country. “To prevent any bloodshed that we abhor and which serves only the common enemies of Romania and the Axis, aware that the policy of Germany and Italy demands special circumstances, which the Iron Guard Movement acknowledges and taking into consideration the fact that between the leadership of the state and the Iron Guard negotiations have started to clear the situation I order the cessation of any skirmish or battle in order to facilitate the unfolding of these negotiations!”
When I got there the phone was in operation. I tried to contact Mihai Antonescu and I found him after a couple of minutes at the Presidency of the Council. He told me that “the rebels have capitulated everywhere in the country, with the exception of those at the Police Prefect’s Office, who still have time until two in the afternoon to surrender”. I congratulated him, saying to convey to general Antonescu “my sincere felicitations for the victory scored against the rebels.” I then asked him to put us through, if possible, to general Antonescu so that Lupu could speak to him. I got the connection immediately and Lupu expressed his satisfaction, in an obvious state of excitement. “I congratulate you, general, from the bottom of my heart, for the victory against these traitors of the country and I beg you to rest assured of all my gratitude and that of my friends. I shall not detain you any more since I realize how precious your time is at such difficult moments for the homeland.” “I did my duty,” Antonescu told him, “removing incompetence, dishonesty, theft and betrayal of the nation from the state apparatus. I will fill the jails with these knaves!”
I then phoned Ghiţă Pop to meet me at 11 at the Club. I went with Lupu and his brother Costache to thank the young people who had guarded the Club on Clémenceau Street. The leaders of our district organizations also came, together with Ella Negruzzi. Ghiţă Pop, Lupu and I made speeches, thanking our youth who had watched the Club and the party headquarters in the Capital. The three of us highlighting the significance of these serious events visited upon the country. “I think that now general Antonescu has realized the mistake of having brought to power people who are not prepared but instead year to feather their nests, capable of the meanest betrayal in order to stay in power,” Lupu evinced. “Let’s hope,” I added, “that general Antonescu will from now on draw all the lessons deriving from these sad events and will realize also the incontestable superiority of democracy which promotes people according to objective criteria, in broad daylight and not according to backstairs influences and the interest of foreign nations.”
We parted in an atmosphere of great enthusiasm.
From the Club several of us went to Lupu’s house on Episcopiei Street where we celebrated the army’s victory with coffee, cakes and a few glasses of wine.
When I got home at half past one powerful gun shots could be heard from downtown. Most likely the army was taking by force the Police Prefect’s Office. My neighbor Mircea Sfat sat at the window with his daughters, commenting aloud on the shooting so that we too could hear him. “These must be the guns of general Dragalina’s army, coming from Ploieşti to help the legionaries.” I close the dining room window not to hear any more of thus nonsense, and we all rejoice at the downfall of the Iron Guard State. Lunch has become a fête for my family and I. For the rest of the day I stayed home, working on the Dairy and then I listened peacefully to foreign stations, Rome, and Berlin, announcing the end of the Iron Guard rebellion and Antonescu’s triumph with the help of the army. London mentions only the end of the legionary rebellion and the fact that order has been reestablished.
Nothing special abroad.
Friday, January 24, 1941
At eight in the morning Maniu calls, having arrived during the night from Sibiu. We decide to meet at 9, at Lupu’s. Ghiţă Pop comes too. The other night at seven Costică Mihăiescu phoned to inform me that by two all the legionaries inside the Police Prefect’s Office had surrendered, being lined up and sent on foot to the Malmaison prison, between cordons of soldiers and in the terrible boos of the crowd.
Yesterday between 4 and 6 in the afternoon Lupu held a meeting at the Club in Clémenceau with the heads of district organizations and the chairmen and secretaries of the more than 80 sections of the Capital organization. A first calculation of the crimes and devastation wrought in Bucharest by three days of rebellion was undertaken. The heads of the district organizations were enjoined to draw up as soon as possible a detailed report about all these things. Until now the known casualties amount to a few hundreds of dead Jews, some of them said to have been taken to the capital’s Slaughterhouse and killed there, while hanging like animals. A few synagogues and hundreds of Jewish houses have been razed after having been plundered of everything inside. Not a single shop has been left standing in the Jewish districts.
Maniu deems that Antonescu’s governance is “irremediably compromised.” “This man,” he says, “has been making blunders after blunders for five months now both in foreign and domestic policy where he has failed miserably. His very communiqué in which he attempts to explain to the country how the rebellion came to be, confirms his own political incapacity because he himself chose these collaborators who have plunged the country into chaos. Someone else in his place would have realized from the very beginning that the Iron Guard Movement in its quality as fifth column will end by claiming full power and this at the instigation of its patrons in Berlin who are very interested in having a regime at their beck and call in Bucharest.” Maniu reads a few excerpts from the communiqué to exemplify his assertions: “In the attack at the Presidency of the Council where two soldiers were killed and an officer wounded not a single rebel was hurt. The gangs of villains – made up of men and women of the lowest class, and a 12-year child who machine-gunned the soldiers – came out unscathed…On Dorobanti Avenue a soldier was caught by the rebels who poured petrol and then set him on fire, under the horrified eyes of his comrades. The same on the banks of the Dambovita. In other streets the soldiers that did not fire their arms were undressed and humiliated, and the officers were called ““curs’ and “scoundrels” like in the most anarchic revolutions. Shots were fired from everywhere, mostly from roofs and windows, against the soldiers who laid down their lives for order in the state. These miserable who found shelter in the Iron Guard only to serve foreign purposes, to break up the country, just like the vagabonds and heinous dregs of the slums who fell did not deserve a better lot.” “Can a man who has such collaborators pretend to be able to govern?” Maniu wonders.
When Lupu asks what Antonescu will do if he strikes completely free of the Iron Guard, Maniu replies energetically and emphatically: “After heading a military government meant to bring back order to the country, he will have to resign and give the King the chance to form a national government, to reinstate the 1923 Constitution and the democratic regime.” Lupu sighs and does not say a single word.
We part and go each to our own business.
On my way home I stop for a moment at C. Mihăiescu’s. I learn from him a very interesting item of information which probably will have unpleasant consequences for Antonescu. The morning before, when King Mihai left Sinaia for Bucharest at the request of the legionaries to mediate their conflict with Antonescu this one would have ordered the army to stop him and make him return to Sinaia, which happened between Câmpina and Ploieşti. If this pieces of news is verified it is easy to imagine how the relations between the sovereign and Antonescu will evolve in the near future.
When I get home at about noon, I ring the Ministry of Justice where I find Ică Antonescu and we agree to meet the following day at 9 in the morning in his office.
I stay indoor for the rest of the day. I read the press, I listen to foreign stations and fill in my dairy. I have not even realized this is the 24th of January!
Saturday, January 25, 1941
At nine of the dot I am introduced in Ică’s office. Like the vainglorious man he is, Ică boasts a plentiful yet wooly discourse. He wants to say too many things and misses the goal of being brief and to the point. I pose two questions: whether a reconciliation with the Iron Guard is still possible and how he sees the relations with Germany. He makes the following answers which spread almost over an hour and which I’ll try to summarize as exactly as possible. A collaboration with the Iron Guard is no longer possible. General Antonescu has long known that “these people are good for nothing other than theft, disorder and seeking their own interest.” If he made them part of the cabinet it was foremost because he wanted to please Hitler and then “burst their bubble”, revealing their political incapacity. According to Ică, “the Germans were very correct with Antonescu. Hitler and his close collaborators were periodically kept abreast of the Iron Guard debauchery, their crimes and highway robberies, aimed only at enriching themselves at the expense of the Jews and the Freemasons. Naturally, some elements of the German SS had secret ties with the Iron Guard leaders unbeknownst to Hitler and the German Legation in Bucharest, but they did not play a decisive role. Sima relied very much on their support, ignoring that other Germans, much more important and always gaining a hearing with Hitler, had an excellent knowledge of the situation in Romania and consequently supported Antonescu unrestrictedly, persuaded that only he could assure the peace, order and collaboration of the Romanian army in case of a conflict with the Soviets.
The newspapers publish general Antonescu’s order of the day to the army expressing gratitude for the discipline proven during the struggle against the “rebels and traitors of the country”. Order has been reinstated in the country, the papers announce. All the Iron Guard prefects have been replaced by militaries. A communiqué of the government demands that the arms held by private persons be surrendered and people is invited “not to buy things purloined during the rebellion. Mihăiescu knows “for sure” from Bungeţeanu that the story with King Mihai being stopped by the army on orders from Antonescu and entreated to return to Sinaia, is perfectly true. Antonescu’s manifesto to the country is a terrible philippic against the Iron Guard Movement and I have to admit it is well written. “Antonescu is a fine pen,” Lupu underlines.
We talk about the foreign situation. Nothing special about that. The Germans have considerably eased up their attacks on London and the other British cities. Are they after a political purpose or they’re simply too weak after the massive loss of planes caused by so many futile raids against the British? Time will tell. Lupu and Mihăiescu think the Germans are sparing their planes in view of the considerable aid they intend to give Italy and the boost meant for the war against the Soviets which, according to them is inevitable and impending. I ask them on what they ground their supposition that Hitler will attack the Soviets. “On intuition more than on political considerations,” Lupu replies. “Politically,” I answer, “if Hitler makes the mistake to venture into a war against Moscow the end will be definitely catastrophic, because a British-Russian-American alliance will then be concluded right away.” “Hitler knows this very well but he is persuaded that until the American juggernaut is set into motion, his blitzkrieg will have taken the Russians out of battle, and then, together with the Japanese, he can discourage the Americans from joining the war,” Mihăiescu points out. He maintains those are the ideas of the Germans in Bucharest to whom he has talked these days. “In this case,” I opine, “Hitler is digging his own grave.”
“One this is certain now,” Lupu remarks. “The war will last quite a few years, given the huge forces involved, and its end is full of unknown elements, especially if secret weapons are going to come up as the Germans and Antonescu’s close aides are implying.” Lupu told us that Dinu Brătianu informed him before the Rebellion that very soon he would be in possession of secret weapons that would insure his triumph over the whole globe. Gh. Brătianu from whom Dinu B. has learnt this, is convinced Hitler didn’t lie to Antonescu. Now I understand why Lupu has again started hesitating about the way the war will end.
In the evening we have many guests: the Ispasius, the Georgescus, Tănăsescus, Mihăilescus and Marinescus, all curious to find out more about the Rebellion and our party’s relations with Antonescu. They are all sincerely happy at Antonescu’s victory and they categorically inveigh against the crimes and robberies perpetrated by the legionaries. They don’t tell me anything new in this respect. Colonel Marinescu provides us with some extra information on the attitude of the German troops in the Capital during the Rebellion and on the way King Mihai was prevented from continuing his voyage to Bucharest. According to the Gendarme Inspectorates the German troops in Bucharest and the rest of the country had been confined to their barracks with an express order from general Hansen not to intervene in the fight between the two sides.
Although Hansen appraised Antonescu of this order, “the man did not take him in earnest,” Marinescu explains, and “took measures so that our units block the German troops in case they tried to get out of their barracks and if need be, disarm them.” Marinescu pretends that the Germans knew about this countermeasure of Antonescu’s and it is “only because of it” that they didn’t step in, to avoid a gory battle against the Romanian army. The fact that the new minister of Germany in Bucharest, von Killinger, arrived in the capital only the day after the Rebellion was quashed, is another proof of the duplicity of the German authorities. Marinescu maintains that Antonescu “is aware” of Hitler’s double game, but “makes believe not to know anything” so that the Fuhrer doesn’t turn his back on him and compel him to side with the legionaries openly.
Marinescu also tells us that Neubacher played an important role in the negotiations held between the Iron Guard and Antonescu during the Rebellion, on the German side, together with P. P. Panaitescu on Sima’s behalf.
According to Marinescu the relations between King Mihai and Antonescu further deteriorated even more because of the Rebellion. Antonescu has long suspected him of sympathizing with the Iron Guard. His men, placed by him so as to keep an eye on the King, convinced him definitively that Mihai, given his hatred for the Lupescu woman became extremely sympathetic to the Iron Guard and Maniu personally! Horia Sima, through two friends of his, asked Mihai insistently to return immediately to the Capital to mediate an understanding with Antonescu who refused all accord unless the Iron Guard laid down their arms. “The fact that Antonescu brutally prevented him from continuing his journey to the Capital,” Marinescu explains, “was the last straw that broke the camel’s back. Mihai’s reaction was violent and he stomped his feet before the officer who was trying politely to persuade him to return to Sinaia, and said he would never forgive Antonescu his offence.”
Marinescu has been appraised that a big number of Iron Guard’s most prominent people, headed by Sima were carried to Germany dressed as German military in their trucks. He promises to bring me, the following day at nine, a full list of the casualties incurred during the Rebellion, the document being drawn up that very night at Antonescu’s request.
Ispasiu and Tănăsescu are harsh against Antonescu and make him responsible for all the tragedies visited upon the country since “it is he who’s brought the Fifth Column at the head of the State”. They’re surely right!
Sunday, January 26, 1941
At nine and a half colonel Marinescu brought me the official list of the victims fallen in Bucharest and in the rest of the country during the Rebellion, as drawn up by the Gendarme Inspectorate. In Bucharest there were 20 officers, NCOs and soldiers dead; 51 officers, NCOs and soldiers wounded; 118 civilians, legionaries dead; other 118 (Jews) have been assassinated by the legionaries; 250 wounded. In the provinces: 115 dead and 71 wounded. A total of 370 dead and 377 wounded. Marinescu promises to give me in a couple of days the names of a few German militaries and higher clerks who kept in permanent contact with the Iron Guard and encouraged them to break up with Antonescu, if need be killing him. “The Gendarme Inspectorate and our secret service,” Marinescu told me, “are in possession of conclusive documents in this sense.”
Friday, January 31, 1941
A communiqué of the Ministry of the Interior informs that the rebels arrested at the Police and the State security stations are not ill-treated in any way. Photos of legionaries and their warehouse with weapons and stolen goods are published. 106 more rebels have been caught in the capital, among whom Dumitrescu-Gyr, colonel Zăvoianu, N. Perianu, Lucia Caragea etc. In the country 3923 insurgents have been arrested.
The trial of the rebels will start shortly in the Student’s Hostel at 61 Plevnei Street. The communiqué further specifies that Antonescu saw to it that those arrested be treated well, and that he protests against “the miserable” legionaries who spread the news that he and his friends in the government would be all Freemasons. The communiqué says that very soon all the documentary material about the Freemasons will be made public in order to put an end to all calumnies.
Abroad there is considerable unrest in the Balkans where the German army is expected to intervene with the help of the Italians. The Germans are negotiating with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Turkey to isolate Greece. I don’t think they’ll pull it through since these countries very much fear such an intervention. Right now I hear that the Greek prime minister, general Metaxas has passed away unexpectedly. According to the British press, Belgrade worries a lot about German interference in Balkan matters.
Hitler’s speech is larded with lies, justifying his provocative policy towards Britain and all the peoples fighting to defend their independence. It is with such fables that he tries to win his nation’s confidence and make it follow him in his criminal policy of subduing Europe. I wonder how is it that the German people believes him when he is spewing out such packs of outrageous untruths! It seems he still sticks to the idea that a monstrous lie which one keeps on repeating may be more easily swallowed than a small one, not so loud proclaimed! This is a sample of his utterly deceitful, ridiculous assertions. According to him, Britain is after European and world supremacy. The Brits excluded Germany and Italy from world life for three centuries. Hitler maintains that socially Britain was the most backward country in Europe socially and that it has always used other nations to assure its hegemony over the whole world. Then stresses that the Versailles Treaty has now been completely discarded and with it Britain has been relegated from the European continent. He also declares that he has nothing against the American people, that he hopes to reach and understanding with France ad that he is certain of Italy’s and Japan’s friendship. After repeating that the German army is invincible, Hitler pompously asserts that “1941 will be a historic year of a new order in Europe.”
I would like to see what Antonescu says not say now when we have been publicly informed that the Versailles Treaty has been finally rescinded. Can he put any trust in Hitler’s word that in case of a victory he will observe the frontiers of Greater Romania, the greatest achievement of that treaty? Will Hitler stick to his promise to acknowledge our frontiers when he has broken all the pledges given to France, Britain, Holland, Czechoslovakia, Austria, Poland, etc. etc.? Can Antonescu be so naïve? We must to our utmost to persuade him that Hitler will deceive us too just as he deceived everybody, and if we fail to convince him it is our national duty to get rid of him in order to save the country!
Maniu will be here tonight.
Saturday, February 1, 1941
Bureau meeting at Mihai Popovici’s, at 11. Mihalache, who has been in the capital for two days, is also present. There are also Ghiţă Pop, Lupu, Sauciuc Săveanu and Halippa. Mihalache saw Antonescu yesterday morning in the presence of Ică, between 12 and 1. He briefs us on the talk had with Antonescu who, although down with the flu for several days, received him at the Presidency of the Council “as amicably as possible.” Mihalache says he sincerely congratulated him on the victory against the traitors of the homeland. Antonescu was very flattered “to be acknowledged, at least by some of our foremost party members, the merit of having saved the country from such bandits. He also complained that “Maniu and other of his friends still criticize him and don’t recognize him any merit.”
When asked by Mihalache about the Germans’ attitude towards the Rebellion, Antonescu strongly defended Hitler and his government, stating that it was only isolate and irresponsible elements that could have any connection with the Iron Guard. “Hitler has put great trust in me,” he told Mihalache and he gave me a free hand to do anything I think fit with them in order to keep the peace and quiet.” Antonescu assured him that he would send the rebels to trial and punish them exemplarily. That the army and the police had categorical orders not to spare anyone and to smoke out any place they think may be harboring rebellious legionaries or stashing arms and stolen goods. “I will stamp out his Movement of bandits and criminals,” Antonescu added.
To another question by Mihalache, Antonescu replied that “a considerable number of legionaries, at the head with Zelea Codreanu , publicly disown Sima and the other rebels.” In conclusion, Mihalache believes that at present Antonescu is doing the country a big service by his action of denouncing the Iron Guard Movement. Therefore, we, the party “mustn’t make it difficult for him.”
Throughout the man’s speech, Maniu showed signs of irritation but did not cut him short. Lupu, who knows the opinion of Maniu, Ghiţă Pop and I thought it best o keep quiet, leaving the task of making a due reply to the chairman. He began by referring to Mihalache’s assertion that Antonescu, by destroying the Iron Guard “is making up for the mistake of having put them in power.” “The man who has made such a blunder, Mr. Mihalache,” my friend told him, “can make others, even bigger, such as that of tying the country’s destiny to that of adventurers like Hitler and Mussolini who are heading towards catastrophe, they and their peoples stultified by blatant propaganda.”
Ghiţă Pop repeated then our well-known catchphrase, reaching the conclusion that we have to avail ourselves of these sad occurrences and force Antonescu to resign so that a national cabinet be formed, proclaiming our neutrality. “If I were as certain as you,” Mihalache replied, “that Hitler and Mussolini are heading for a disaster, then your solution would definitely be the most logical. But I am not convinced of that and therefore I believe that our country cannot pursue any policies today other than those of general Antonescu. I have expressed my opinion in all honesty. Mr. Maniu is our chairman and bears all the responsibility. He also has discretionary powers on behalf of the party and is free to do what he thinks best for the country. After having voiced my opinion I will toe the line like a disciplined party member that I am. May God see that Maniu’s policy turns out right!” “I am persuaded this is the best way for the country,” Maniu contented himself to remark. Lupu, Mihai Popovici, Sauciuc Săveanu, Halippa and I kept quiet.
I then read our memorandum to Antonescu and King Mihai. I give here only a few ideas that caused brisk discussion in the bureau meeting. (The full text will be published in the annex of the 1941 Diary.) “Instead of proceeding to the creation of a national government as you, general, have pledged your honor before Messrs. Maniu and Dinu Brătianu, on September 3 and 4 last year you encroached the promise made before us and accepted to take over power all by yourself from a sovereign dethroned with our ascent, and set up a military dictatorship. Subsequently, you further worsened things, taking as associates the representatives of a Movement on the payroll of the two dictators, Hitler and Mussolini, suspending all parties and proclaiming ‘The Iron Guard State’ that is the dictatorship of this Movement which you are today trying to destroy. Your mistake is so gross that you should not grumble if the country today no longer trusts your political capacities. The National Peasant Party and the Liberal party drew your attention in time to these blunders but you chose to ignore them. Pay day has come sooner than expected. The errors are paid by all, no matter their position. To the benefit of the country we ask you to be so kind as to resign in order to make it easier for H. M. the King to form a new national cabinet.”
When I finished reading this part, Mihalache cut me short and asked Maniu if he had the courage to sign it. “The fragment in point,” Maniu replied promptly, “represents a historic truth and consequently I don’t see why I shouldn’t sign it.” “In this case,” Halippa chimed in, “we all go to jail because Antonescu will never give in to our threats, especially now that he has the support of the Germans.” “The political leaders of a people when they know they have taken the right path for pursuing this people’s interests must not fear jail. If they are afraid for their own needs they must then step down from their leading posts and let others, more valiant, to take their places.” “Very good,” stressed Lupu, “this is the correct answer.”
Ioan HUDIŢĂ, a historian with a doctorate in France and an outstanding academic career (the University of Iaşi/Jassy, the Academy of Economic Studies, the Faculty of History, the Advanced School of Archive Keeping, and, from 1944, as tenured professor with a course of lectures in the history of diplomacy at the University of Bucharest), was Deputy Secretary General of Iuliu Maniu’s National Peasant Party for five critical years in Romanian – and world – history (1940-1945).
* European Institute, Iaşi, 1998, 2000. With an introductory study and notes by Dan Berindei, Romanian Academy.
[i] Dr. Nicolae Lupu, vice-president of the National Peasant Party (NPP);
[ii] Gheorghe Tătărescu, liberal politician, prime minister (1934-1937, 1939-1940), imprisoned at Sighet (1950-1955);
[iii] Iuliu Maniu (1873-1953, died in Sighet prison), president of the NPP, prime minister (1928-1930, 1932-1933);
[iv] Gheorghe Pop (1893-1969), member of the politburo of the NPP;
[v] Constantin (Dinu) Brătianu (1866-1950, died in Sighet prison), president of the National Liberal Party;
[vi] Wilhelm Filderman (1882-1964), lawyer, leader of the Jewish Community in Romania;
[vii] Ion Mihalache (1882-1963), president (1933-1937) and later vice-president of the NPP;
[viii] Mihai Popovici (1879-1966), vice-president of the NPP;
[ix] Virgil Madgearu (1887-1940), economist, general secretary of the NPP, assassinated by the legionaries;
[x] Romanian industrialist;
[xi] Constantin (Costică) Mihăiescu, owner of Mihăiescu Garages;
[xii] Nicolae Titulescu (1884-1941), diplomat, Minister of Foreign Affairs (1927-1928, 1932-1936), President of the League of Nations (1930-1931);
[xiii] Ion Antonescu (1882-1946), Romania’s leader between 1940-1944, sentenced to death and executed in 1946;
[xiv] Wilhelm Fabricius (1882-1964), Germany’s plenipotentiary minister to Romania (1936-1941);
[xv] (1887-1955), general, Minister of the Interior during Carol’s final reign years;
[xvi] Mihai (Ica) Antonescu (1904-1946), Minister of Justice and Foreign Affairs (1940-1944), sentenced to death and executed in 1946;
[xvii] Horia Sima (1907-1993), leader of the legionary movement after the execution of Corneliu Zelea Codreanu; died in exile;
[xviii] (1884-1958), president of Plowmen’s Front, Prime Minister (1948-1952) and President of the Great National Assembly (1952-1958) during the communist regime;
[xix] Nicadors – the Three Iron Guard members, Nicolae Constantinescu, Ion Caranica and Doru Belimace, who assassinated prime minister I. G. Duca and, in their turn, were executed in the autumn of 1938;
[xx] Hermann Neubacher, German chargé d’affaires.