Iaşi, July 12, 1942. We get news from Bucharest that Marshal Ion Antonescu is seriously ill in Predeal. All kinds of versions about his disease, general anemia or the consequences of an old syphilis, so he had to undergo malaria treatment.
Meanwhile, it seems that the old political parties are getting restless, and Mihai Antonescu, deputy chairman of the government, is trying a rapprochement to the Iron Guard in order to create a party. [...] It is obvious that the domestic situation is bad, that the world of politics is beginning to fret against Marshal Antonescu, who is going blindly on in this war, deeply believing that he is moving toward victory. All this only comes from the fact that Marshal Antonescu has a deep feeling that he is a genius, that he is better than everyone else, and that his decisions are the best. Anyway, he acts like a dictator, and dictators have never been able to accept advisers, they only want accomplices. Actually, with this man, appearances are better than reality, he lacks modesty, likes to be flattered, and he has assumed a responsibility that he is not going to be able to carry out up to the end. I am horrified at the abuse and thefts that are being committed; I am horrified at the inability of certain ministers: they are not adequate for the present times, they are just a bunch of people flattering the marshal and his wife [...]
August 5, 1942. [...]
I found Cernăuţi flourishing; the shops evacuated by the Jews have been reopened by Romanians. All the factories are working. There is only one sad thing: that they do business and even atrocities are being committed against the Jews who must be evacuated out of Bukovina. Plus, a lot of adventurers came in and took over the factories, making huge profits. I found a lot of do-nothings who came here to get rich, and who were not embarrassed to say that they came to the Romanian California in order to get rich.
Iaşi, August 7, 1942. The Romanian troops have begun to be shipped to the front along the Cernăuţi-Lemberg route, and from there eastward, to Dnepropetrovsk-Stalino. [...]
The news from the front is good, especially the operations in the Caucasus, which are moving very fast. We feel we are getting close to the end of the war, and I wonder if we are not going to arrive there when it is over. In that event, we will get either an occupation mission over the vast conquered territory, or a mission to occupy a portion of the defensive front, which will be established in winter. We would have liked to participate in combat missions, but we are probably arriving too late.
Iaşi, August 14, 1942. [...] Nations need to create idols and heroes, and the choice does not fall on those who deserve it; in many cases, it is fate that decides. Indeed, we can say that in history only names and dates are true, while facts are forged more often than not.
Iaşi, August 18, 1942. [...] The newspapers have published a report filed by the Patronage Society, which is run by Mrs. Antonescu, in order to snuggle down the public, which is increasingly alarmed because of the fraud being committed there. Anyway, the report is interesting, considering the fantastic sums of money handled by that society, which are taken out of the state budget; and the members of the society are bragging about their success, when their personal contributions are actually zero. [...]
Iaşi, August 31, 1942. I went to Bucharest for a couple of days, and I took care of some personal business. [...]
I saw General Şteflea, chief of the General Staff, who briefed me about the future mission on the front. There is talk about forming a group of armies (the Third and Fourth Romanian Armies and the Sixth German Army) under the command of Marshal Antonescu. I do not know whether the marshal will be healthy enough to exercise this command, but I can see this man’s ambition, who wants to appear as a great commander now, at the end of the operations. In order to satisfy this ambition of his, he is sending the entire Romanian army to the front, even if the Germans never asked him to do that. [...]
January 30, 1943. Nothing but music and speeches on German radio stations, because this is the 10th anniversary of I-do-not-know-what event of National Socialism. We must have gotten this craze about speeches from the Germans.
In Stalingrad, the German Sixth Army and the Romanian troops (the First Cavalry Division and the Twentieth Infantry Division) are breathing their last. Therefore Fuehrer Hitler has not worked the miracle to relieve the troops here, which are mostly German, therefore he will never take the trouble to relieve the ones on the Don River, which are only Romanian! [...]
Volnovakha, January 31, 1943. [...] In Stalingrad, 22 German divisions and two Romanian ones are on the verge of death. If the Germans had ordered an withdrawal in time, we would have been on the Cir River today with 200,000 Germans and 100,000 Romanians, and we would have been able to hold out. Now everything is lost because of the resistance and encircling tactics imagined by the Fuehrer. Of course, the Russian army, now freed because the Stalingrad forces were destroyed, will create an even greater crisis in another part of the front. [...]
Pologye, February 3, 1943. [...] In Pologye, much to my surprise, I find very many German soldiers, teeming everywhere; most have run away from the units that were withdrawing from the Caucasus, and now the German command is trying to gather them.
In the evening I listen to the Fuehrer’s salute to the German Sixth Army, which capitulated at Stalingrad, on the radio. He mentions that two Romanian divisions and a Slovak regiment were there, too. A few days before, I think, Goebbels said the word “capitulation” does not exist in German dictionaries. The Stalingrad episode is over; one marshal and many generals captured: the Russians can be proud of such a capture. And all these misfortunes because Hitler believes he is a great strategist. Hitler’s speech ended this way: “They sacrificed to save us.” Not much consolation for the sacrificed ones – and then, we will see whether this sacrifice will bring about salvation. I believe they would have been more useful if they had withdrawn and held out somewhere else. [...]
COMMANDER OF THE FOURTH ARMY
February 23, 1943. Today I am leaving for Crimea. [...] I cross the Dnepr River on the ice and I go south, on a bad road. [...]
So, here I am in Crimea, where my new mission begins. [...]
March 4, 1943. [...] I am indoors listening to Radio Bucharest, where Propaganda Minister Marcu is making a speech about the radio. This minister is a great fan of Italy, and he does not know how dissonant his praising words sound in our souls, because all our misfortune comes from Italy, too. This country, overlooking our blood ties, did us the great injustice of supporting the Hungarians – and this is how we lost the greatest part of Transylvania under the Vienna diktat of August 1940. In the past, too, I remember Italy was the last country to recognize our rights over Bessarabia, and that only happened after the Averescu government bought some old Italian weapons, which means that we paid them to recognize our rights. [...]
Bucharest, March 10, 1943. After the agreement made on the phone with Colonel Zaharia, the marshal’s chief of staff, I went to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers at 7.30 PM. The marshal was very busy; many people were waiting for audiences. He did not ask me anything about the front, he told me directly that I had been called to say whether I accept to become chief of the Military House of His Majesty the King. He explained to me that the king was too young, and that older, more experienced people had to be placed around him, and this is why he considered me and Grigorcea, as palace marshal; Grigorcea was minister to Rome at the time, but he was to be recalled for this high post. Of course, I was extremely surprised, because I believed I had been called to report on what I had found in Crimea and the Caucasus, and I had brought documentation with me about that.
Although I had been absent from Bucharest for a long time, some rumors about the tension between the king and the marshal had reached me. Of course, I could not respond immediately; I said I wanted to see the king first and then read the Royal House Statutes, to see what my duties will be and if I would be able to carry them out. The audience ended at that, so I was expected to give my definitive answer after I became perfectly well informed.
March 12, 1943. At noon I had an audience with the king, and the queen mother attended. I described to them my meeting with the marshal, and I asked them if they agreed to my appointment to this post, or whether it was the marshal’s initiative. The king told me he had asked the marshal for me and the marshal accepted, even more, he had asked for me as early as the preceding year, but the marshal disagreed, saying he needed me on the front. The queen filled me in on the tension between the king and the marshal, saying they were terrorized by the marshal and threatened to be expelled. The king is being completely sidelined and treated as if he did not matter, all powers having been taken away from him; all he has left is the right to give decorations and grant pardons, and those, of course, according to the marshal’s indications.
When I heard all this, I realized I was getting a post entailing much responsibility and which was not exactly easy – namely to be some kind of a buffer between the king and the marshal. [...]
The king accepted my suggestions, so I accepted to become chief of the Military House.
Meanwhile, there was much talk in Bucharest about the situation between the king and the marshal, and they were all on the king’s side, especially the politicians in all parties. When they heard I was being appointed to this post close to the king, they all agreed it was a good choice, but they were afraid I would not accept, and this is why many were keen to visit me and explain to me that I should not hesitate, as this is in the best interest of the country, because the king was too young and needs a devoted adviser, plus the marshal had to be held in check. Generals Mihail, Pleniceanu, and Niculescu – comrades and friends – came to my home and gave me details about the disagreement between the king and the marshal, and they told me it would be a great misfortune for this country if the marshal made it so that the king had to abdicate, so I had to stay. I told them that I had accepted the post in principle, following my audience with the king.
March 13, 1943. People in the city do not know about my decision, so they keep asking me to accept the post. [...]
I find that the marshal has become unpopular and everybody hates him, but he is staying in power due to the Germans, who do not trust anybody else. People are mostly unhappy because the Romanian army was defeated in Russia and because of his wife’s behavior, who acts like a queen. [...]
March 15, 1943. I got to see the marshal to give him my definitive answer. I feel the marshal is not happy with my decision, and he hoped I would not accept. [...] Marshal Antonescu would have liked the king to remain in complete isolation.
March 16, 1943. I go to the war minister, advise him of my decision, and ask him to prepare the appointing decree. [...]
March 27, 1943. The decree has not been issued yet, so people are intrigued. When I went to the ministry I found the decree signed both by the king and by the marshal, so I ordered it to be sent immediately to the Official Gazette. When the decree was published, the public quieted down, and I am opening a new chapter in my activity. I confess I am worried, starting out on a new road. Will I get to the end of this road in good conditions? It is up to fate.
June 1943. Since the marshal had put enormous distance between the army and the king, I decided to help the king get in contact with the army again, little by little and quietly. I take advantage of the opportunity that the Germans were selling some cars in Galaţi and the king wanted to buy one, so I arrange the king’s agenda – the king will visit the Galaţi squadron of fighter aircraft, where I have high school friends, and the queen mother will visit the hospitals in town. [...]
On June 4 in the morning we landed on the Galaţi airport, where an honor company welcomed the king with flags and music, and so did all the senior officers and generals in the garrison, with the mayor and the county prefect. The king spent all morning among the officers in the squadron of fighter aircraft, displaying competent knowledge about aircraft and engines. In fact, I believe that if he had not been king, he would have made an excellent mechanical engineer, as he has talent for that. I arranged for him to have lunch at the air force officers’ mess, not on the royal yacht, which was in the harbor. [...] My idea was good, because the lunch atmosphere was so warm, that every man felt close to the royal family.
Still to obtain this rapprochement between the king and the army, several lunches followed in Sinaia, with all the generals invited there, one by one. On June 11 the conscripts of the Guard Battalion took the oath in the king’s presence. The ceremony was held in Sinaia on the bank of the Prahova River. The king spoke enthusiastically to the young soldiers. [...]
July 1943. Field Marshal von Manstein arrives in Bucharest; he is the conqueror of Sevastopol. Last winter he commanded the group of armies beaten by the Russians, where Romanians also participated, unfortunately. [...]
On July 12, the king and the queen mother went to Constanţa; the king visited the navy and the navy air force, and the queen mother visited the hospitals in Constanţa and Carmen Sylva. [...]
In recent days the press wrote about the visit of Mihai Antonescu, vice-president of the government and foreign minister, to Italy, where he met with the king of Italy and with Mussolini. I believe they are over-covering this event, because everything will be reduced to sending food to the hungry people in Italy, although this country does not deserve our contribution; it has always supported Hungary and Bulgaria against our interests.
The operations in Sicily are going badly for the Italians and Germans, and on July 26 we heard that Mussolini resigned and Marshal Badoglio replaced him. Let the Italians get fed up with the totalitarian regime, through which an adventurer has led the country to disaster. Mussolini’s resignation must have produced disappointment in Germany.
On July 27 I was called to Sinaia urgently. When I arrived, the king and the queen mother were in an audience with Mihai Antonescu, who had returned from Italy. [...] After the guests left, the king and the queen mother filled me in on what Mihai Antonescu had said. They are expecting Italy to get out of the action. The government has approached Hungary and Bulgaria, to see if there is any possibility of all of us leaving the Axis at the same time. I said this was wrong, and that they should negotiate with England through Turkey, to see what advice England is offering to us and how we have been treated in England’s conventions with Russia. The king and the queen mother are thinking that if the events precipitate, they should leave. I told them not to worry, the events could not precipitate soon. I believe the British have no interest for Germany to be destroyed and Europe invaded by the Russians. England knows very well that Germany alone can stop the Russians. If Hitler leaves the way Mussolini did, one hour earlier, this will be in favor of the British and Germans making it up, which would make Europe happy. I wonder if Hitler is capable of such patriotism. Generally, dictators cling to power up to the end.
The British prime minister is making a very measured speech. Italy’s decision is being expected; the newly-formed government is made up of older people, which is very significant, because it seems that they are going back to older formulas. Recently, young people in all countries, allowed to run things, have led the world to disaster. There are movements against Fascism in Italy. The British-American press is attacking Mussolini, only the Hungarian press is taking his side. Benes’ speech in London, supporting us against the Hungarians, is interesting.
We would not have one worry now if our army was whole and if we had not interfered in the war against Russia! We would have carried a lot of weight, and we may have decided the fate of the war, intervening at the last moment.
The Turkish press suggests that the Russian claims against us are not only limited to Bukovina and Bessarabia, they also want Dobrogea. I believe this is not about Dobrogea, because a conflict would emerge, since neither England nor Turkey will allow the Danube mouth to be occupied and the Russians to get close to Constantinople. Perhaps that conflict would be in our favor.
August 1943. This very day, August 1, at 1.40 PM, the air alarm was sounded. The enemy (Americans and Canadians) came via Bistreţu on the Danube with 130 bomber planes, and attacked the oil region in Prahova Valley. [...] Ploieşti has become world famous: all the radio stations talk about is the raid against that city. News arrives that the destructions are much heavier. The government is bracing to issue a communiqué, hiding the seriousness of the situation.
The situation in Italy is still unclear. [...] Great shame on the Italians, because the Anglo-Americans are conquering Sicily and perhaps all of Italy with 14 divisions; if there is any resistance left in Sicily, this is probably due to German troops. Heavy fighting on the eastern front, the Germans have lost Orel. The Russians are making huge efforts to arrive in the Balkans before the Anglo-Americans.
I went to the General Staff to get the complete documentation on the aircraft that bombed the oil region. Obviously, the main refineries have been shut down. Going through the documents found in the planes that were shot down and those found with the aviators that have been captured, I see with pleasure that our people is characterized as having national dignity, not hating the Anglo-Americans, and only hating the Russians and even the Germans. All the prisoners are happy with the way they have been treated: they are asking not to be handed over to the Germans, but to be gathered in a camp, where they want a teacher to teach them Romanian. Before this raid Romania did not have anything to suffer from air incursions. Only the Russians made a few attempts, with few airplanes and weak results. This time, however, we had to suffer. The prisoners admit that the air defense was good and active, which is why they had losses they did not expect. [...]
The army and army corps commanders have been called at the War Ministry to be briefed about the situation and most of all about the project to organize the army. There are still those among us who believe that Germany is training a powerful army, which will deal a decisive blow. They are so far from reality! In Italy – chaos.
December 1943. The situation on the eastern front is bad. The Russians keep enlarging the bridgeheads west of the Dnepr River. I believe the Germans will soon be forced to move their defense much further to the west, perhaps on the Bug River, if not even on the Dniester River, and abandon the Baltic countries. The Anglo-Americans are advancing slowly in Italy.
We spend a sad Christmas. Now people are aware of the misfortune approaching us. The newspapers can no longer deceive the public. Concern is taking over everyone’s soul, little by little.
January and February 1944. [...]
Great panic in Romania! They ordered the evacuation of Bukovina, Bessarabia, and northern Moldavia. The trains are full of people. The government makes the mistake of withdrawing the authorities as well, abandoning the peasants who are not being evacuated. The order came to mobilize the Fourth Army Corps, not in order to participate in the operations, but to maintain order and recall the mobilized men in case the Russians cross the Dniester River. By the end of the month, the situation improves a little, because the Germans managed to patch up the front. [...]
Bad domestic situation; basic product prices are going up. The Iron Guard members and the Communists are beginning to be active.
February 1944. [...]
They are continuing to evacuate the north of the country.
I read each day the Operations Barometer of the General Staff to keep His Majesty informed, and I never find any improvement on the front. I expect the German defense to be moved on Bug or the Dniester River soon. In Poland the Russians have penetrated deeply enough, and they are threatening the communications to Lemberg.
By end-February we are beginning to think about an armistice. We gather at the Little House – the king’s house behind the palace in Victoria Street – and we begin the first talks. The following participate in those talks: the King, Foreign Minister Niculescu Buzeşti, Sbârcea, deputy palace marshal, Ioaniţiu, the king’s secretary, and myself. I see in these talks: Niculescu Buzeşti is more measured and better informed, Sbârcea is more impulsive, to which is added his personal hatred of Marshal Antonescu.
March 1944. The work of the Higher Army Council lasted for 16 days, and all they dealt with was promotions, characterizations, and complaints. We are not being briefed about any large projects that would be of interest to the army – especially operations.
Meanwhile, the marshal and General Şteflea went to see Hitler again, and they came back optimistic; I do not understand the basis for that optimism. [...]
I guess the Germans are planning to withdraw up to the Carpathian Mountains, turning Moldavia into the operations theater. People are worried sick thinking about a massive evacuation. The marshal, despite his characteristic obstinacy, must see that his policy was wrong. We had no business participating in this great conflict, and it would have been to our advantage if we had been able to stay neutral. An Arab proverb says “When studs fight, let colts stay out of it.”
The representatives of various political parties, who have had no activity so far, are rushing on me to contact the king, and they propose all kinds of solutions, which, vetted, lead to nothing practical and positive.
Considering the serious events on the Bug River, I am surprised that the Germans are not forcing us to order general mobilization. Although I no longer have contact with the troops, I suppose their morale is low, and, if they re-entered the operations, they would no longer react like they used to. Apart from all this, there is tension with Hungary, following some incidents in Cluj.
The German operations on the eastern front are not good strategically. This front, which is so very important, is being left without strategic reserves all the time. Since the Germans still have 300 divisions inside waiting, it would have been wise for 50-60 divisions to stay in Bessarabia and Trans-Dniester, as a strategic reserve for the eastern front. Apart from the fact that these units would not have consumed the little food they have in Germany by staying there, they would have kept the Russians at bay. However, it seems that the Germans are confused, because they are afraid of an Anglo-American invasion on the Atlantic coast, and they are waiting for them with all their forces, while the Russians are operating unhindered. Even if that invasion takes place, they do not need all the German reserves. The German General Staff is unable to assess which one of the two fronts is more dangerous. It is not hard to see that the Russian front is the most dangerous one.
March 18, 1944. [...] The headquarters of the Romanian Fourth Army has been established in Iaşi. [...]
This army has the task to defend the crossing over the Dniester River, to prevent enemy recon detachments from going west of the river.
There is much activity in politics, owing to the initiative of the opposition, not of the government. Barbu Ştirbey left for Cairo to contact the representatives of the three great powers for a separate armistice. Marshal Antonescu, who has never been a politician, is not up to the events, and he seems totally paralyzed in making a decision.
The London and Turkish papers are writing a lot about our situation. Benes’ statements are being discussed; he tells us that the Russians agree to give us the entire Transylvania, but they will take Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina from us. We should act in that direction, so as not to lose everything.
I was on the phone with Savârşin, telling the adjutant on duty to ask the king to come to Sinaia, considering the events. I wanted the king to be closer and impose himself on the government a little, taking advantage of its confusion on the events.
I believe the marshal is not so intransigent anymore.
March 20, 1944. The enemy managed to cross the Dniester River at Soroca. So the Russians are now touching our national soil. The contact between the Russians and the Romanian troops on the Dniester River has been established. Although the Russian forces that crossed the river are weak, our reaction is even weaker, for some reason. [...]
March 21, 1944. I went to Sinaia to brief the king on the situation and to suggest to him what he has to say to Mihai Antonescu, who will have an audience with the king today. The marshal and Mihai Antonescu will go to see Hitler, who may offer us Transylvania. We must not accept that easily, because we are not sure we can keep it; we must not turn the Hungarians into victims in the eyes of the international public. Transylvania should come to us through a plebiscite, and we must make an agreement with the Hungarians through German intervention.
March 22, 1944. I contacted Dinu Brătianu, leader of the National Liberal Party, who presented to me his opinions and the result of the audience Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasant Party, had with the marshal. [...]
March 23, 1944. The king came to Bucharest. The marshal and Mihai Antonescu left for Germany.
Because the Hungarians did not present enough guarantees, the Germans occupied Hungary, taking over the administration. Domestic measures have been taken to prevent something similar from happening here.
Dinu Brătianu is sending me a copy of the protest letter he sent to the marshal. In the afternoon I had a conversation with General Mihail, who has ties with politicians, to find out about everybody’s opinions.
In the evening, at the Little House, we discussed until late at night with the king, Buzeşti, and Stârcea, to see how we could bring about the armistice.
March 25, 1944. The Annunciation. We hope for some good news, too, today. The reality is sad. The enemy is advancing everywhere. [...] The disaster is probably beginning. The exodus of the Moldavian population is touching.
People are waiting for the marshal to come back from Germany.
March 27, 1944. Yesterday, the marshal had an audience with the king. I think he came back from Hitler without any positive result, and he does not even believe in the efficiency of the measures that will be taken. [...]
The king left for Sinaia. There is talk about a Crown Council; I disagree, because that would engage the king, who has not been consulted about anything so far, and now they are trying to place all the responsibility on his back. Then there is the question on how the Germans will see this council; will they occupy us entirely, like it happened to the Hungarians, and so we will lose our entire freedom of action?
We are advancing fast toward disaster. The people coming from Moldavia are informing me that the army is in a very bad shape in point of equipment and discipline. Thousands of German deserters have gathered in Galaţi; very many have begun to curse Hitler – they used to worship him before. People are maddened, because the Moldavian refugees spread panic wherever they go. [...]
March 18, 1944. I was called to Sinaia urgently. After examining the political and military situation, I requested an audience with Mihai Antonescu; I went to see him late in the evening with Negel, the administrator of the Crown Domains, and Sbârcea. Since the Germans are not observing their commitment to defend our soil, we no longer have any obligation, either. We analyze again to see whether it is a good idea to hold a Crown Council. We need to hear the marshal’s opinion as well.
The Germans force us to withdraw to a position south of Iaşi, namely Dealu Mare-Strunga-Târgu Neamţ, as well as to Corneşti Plateau in Bessarabia. Therefore, we cede northern Moldavia and Bessarabia.
March 30, 1944. Private lunch at the Little House: the king, the marshal, Mihai Antonescu, and me. After lunch we examine the situation. Some disagreement between the marshal and Mihai Antonescu. It seems that the latter is inclined to side with us, to request an armistice. The marshal wants to reinforce the position at Dealu Mare-Târgu Frumos-Strunga, where he believes the enemy can be stopped. It would be a great gain to hold out there until the end of the war, which the marshal does not see as too distant in the future. The king asked that the region of Bucharest and Ploieşti be emptied of troops. At the same time, it has been agreed to test the ground in Ankara for an armistice with Russia.
I stayed until late in the night with the king, the queen mother, Stârcea, and Ioaniţiu, examining the idea of the opposition: to request an unconditional armistice of Russia and to get the Germans out of this country. It is not practical to accept the unconditional armistice, it would not be much different from an unconditional surrender. We must negotiate with the Russians in order to obtain certain facilities, and this is only possible as long as we still have an army on the front that can hold out. I believe the other part is very difficult. It is easy to come up with an idea – chasing the Germans out of this country – but there are two great hurdles against implementing it: one, the Germans are strong and numerous here, and two, how will the officers and the soldiers react to the idea of turning against the Germans? There is military honor, and that would not admit this act of treason. We need to wait a little longer and analyze everything carefully, so as not to rush into an adventure.
31 March 1944. Mihai Antonescu was scheduled to have talks with various political personalities, who are very keen for us to get out of the war, but none of them comes up with any solution on how to do that. I am curious to see the result, and who is the man who will assume responsibility to take up the reins of the government.
PALACE MARSHAL
April 1, 1944. Since His Majesty is beginning to be active in politics, he proposes to me to become palace marshal. As chief of the Military House, people would become suspicious if they saw me talking to politicians, but as palace marshal it would be my duty to keep contact with people outside. As palace marshal I am the highest-ranking dignitary of the palace, and I have more freedom of action. They drafted the royal decision appointing me to that post today, and it was published in the Official Gazette.
I went to see Tătărescu at his home, and we talked about the unfortunate situation we are in. We decided to go see Mihai Antonescu, in order to determine the government to make a decision.
April 4, 1944. [...] At 1.40 PM the alarm sounded and 250 British-US planes came in and bombed Bucharest for one hour and a half, severely damaging the neighborhoods of Cotroceni, Griviţa, and the North Railroad Station.
This bombing was a great surprise to us, because we had gotten used to the idea that Bucharest will not be bombed. After the bombing stopped, Their Majesties went to Sinaia.
April 5, 1944. So far we have 900 killed and 1,200 wounded. There is no water in town, as the water pipes and the Grozăveşti water plant are damaged. The trams have been stopped. Lucky the power is still on.
In the afternoon, the alarm was sounded again. Approximately 300 planes came close to Bucharest, but then they were directed to Ploieşti, where they bombed the South Railroad Station heavily. There are huge losses, especially in the center and at the oil refineries.
In Bucharest there is a shortage of food, because people who usually bring supplies from out of town are afraid to come in now.
April 6, 1944. The king arrives from Sinaia, and I am able to give him complete details on the bombing in Ploieşti. I called Mihai Antonescu to the palace, where the king asked him to advise him on the actions for the armistice. It seems that the marshal supports that idea as well. We communicate to Ştirbey in Cairo to try to obtain guarantees from the Anglo-Americans, because we do not trust those agreed on with the Russians.
I had lunch with the king at Scrovişte, then we returned to the palace to see Mihai Antonescu again. He tells us that Mihalache, vice-president of the National Peasant Party, is scheduled to meet the marshal and himself, to listen to the opinions of the opposition. By evening, the king left for Sinaia, after we visited he North Railroad Station, to see the effect of the bombing.
All my acquaintances are all over me to find out what decision the government will make. I cannot tell them anything, because we need absolute discretion if we want to accomplish anything. [...]
May 11, 1944. Meeting with Dinu Brătianu and Maniu, who gave me a letter pledging to support the military government that will sign the armistice, subsequently taking over power.
May 15, 1944. I was on the front, and I met with various commanders in Bacău and Roman. The front has an entirely different opinion on the necessary action for the armistice. Their soldier’s honor does not allow them to commit felony against the Germans – turning against them, like the Italians did – especially since the Germans are making every effort to maintain the current front. They fight side by side with strong élan, and gave us the materials we need. Everybody supports an armistice, but done in dignity and chivalry. Take advantage of a difficult situation and ask the Germans openly for the authorization to get out of the action.
People will be stunned when I tell all this to the political groups, whose slogan is “The end justifies the means.” And I understand all too well my comrades on the front, and I am sorry I am not in their midst all the time.
May 16, 1944. Meeting with Dinu Brătianu and Maniu, I told them what I found on the front. Of course they are stunned. I went to Sinaia to advise the king.
In late May we have a drop in the domestic political activity. Equally quiet on the Moldavian front.
June 6, 1944. The Anglo-American invasion on the French coast. Very important event. Let us see whether this invasion will be successful, because the Germans have taken all measures, they even sacrificed the eastern front in order to deal with this invasion.
June 8, 1944. Since suddenly siding with the Allies will probably not be successful at this time, we think about staging a diversion, ousting the marshal from power with the consent of the Germans and establishing a Gigurtu government, because the Germans like him [...]
June 19, 1944. In spite of all his efforts, Gigurtu was not successful. Of course, the Germans did not approve a change of government now; although they realize that the marshal has lost any and all popularity in this country, they still believe he has an edge over the military.
June 21, 1944. With Buzeşti and Colonel Dămăceanu we drafted the telegram that has to be sent to the Allies, where we state that the political action in this country can only be carried out at the same time with the Russian offensive on our front and with airborne troops that will support the political action, because there are too few troops domestically, compared with the Germans. The Russian offensive on the front would keep the Germans busy, so we would have freedom of action domestically. We could order our troops on the front not to fight, thus facilitating the Russian action.
June 22, 1944. Three years of war to the day. When we began the war, I do not believe that anybody expected it to take this long. [...]
Almost every night we meet discreetly in various houses to work on the details of the domestic action in the event that the plan for us to separate from the Germans is applied. [...]
June 30, 1944. [...]
In Romania the activity of the opposition is being increasingly felt. I am surprised that the Germans are not arresting us, because they must have scented out what is going on.
July 1944. On the first days of July we are busy completing the action plan, in all its details. We must extend our circle to include people we absolutely need. [...]
July 17, 1944. We get a response from Stockholm to the telegram sent by Buzeşti, that they will study our armistice project and the way we plan to act. [...]
July 21, 1944. In Germany there was an attempt on Hitler’s life, right at the headquarters. Hitler was only injured. It is a pity the attempt was not successful, success would have disentangled the situation.
Arrests and executions. The movement against Hitler must be much wider, and it can only be well organized, so, even if Hitler got away now, he will not get away again next time. Anyway, it is obvious that some of the army commanders are against him; this is where his downfall will come from. [...]
August 1944. We do not agree on the formation of the government. The politicians want a military government. I oppose this, because a military government would look like a dictatorship of the king, and the king will remain too uncovered. Then, I know well that the Allies would like a political government, made up of representatives of all parties, so the entire public will be represented.
After many discussions, Maniu is persuaded to support this idea, but on condition Dinu Brătianu and Mihalache will be part of this government if he accepts to be president of the Council of Ministers. However, I know well that both Dinu Brătianu and Mihalache will not hear of a political government, they want a military government.
August 2, 1944. Turkey has broken its relations with Germany. I believe this is a favorable event to get out of the war. I asked to see Mihai Antonescu, and I talked to him about this situation. I told them they were twice guilty: first because they are not doing anything, and then because they are not letting others do anything. I told him to send somebody to Moscow, so that we will not lose the armistice conditions. General Aldea offers to go, in spite of all the risks.
August 4, 1944. General Şteflea called me to show me the situation of the Germans in the country, as the marshal ordered him to. Indeed, there are over 650,000 Germans spread all over this country, so it will be risky to take action against them. [...]
August 5, 1944. The marshal left for Germany with Mihai Antonescu and General Şteflea. I suppose Hitler wants to discuss their attitude on breaking relations with Turkey.
I would not be surprised if Hitler demands general mobilization and a withdrawal on the Focşani-Bolgrad front.
August 8, 1944. The marshal came back very depressed. Hitler called him to intimidate him and to tell him he is not in control of the domestic situation.
August 20, 1944. All this time I have had talks with politicians. The king also received Mihalache, who told us that what we want to do is an adventure, and that the marshal alone can sign the armistice. Anyway, he is against a political government, because politicians cannot sign a document ceding part of Bukovina and Bessarabia, but we, the military men, can sign that! I did not understand Mihalache’s logic; if the marshal does not want to do anything, does everyone have to be idle? Of course there are risks; without risks, anybody can start an action.
Exactly on August 19 the Russians began the offensive on our front as well. I believe we lost the best opportunity to sign the armistice, namely between August 7 and 19, when the Germans withdrew all their reserves from our front and before the beginning of the Russian offensive. I feel we have lost everything and our efforts have been in vain, since they have yielded no results. I feel overwhelmed with despair.
August 21, 1944. The Fourth and Sixth Army Corps are upside down. The counterattacks cannot resettle the situation. The Russians also attacked on the Dniester River, where they consolidated a bridgehead in Tighina. They will probably make their effort there. [...]
August 22, 1944. I met with General Pantazi, the war minister, who now supports an armistice as well. I asked him to take certain measures to deploy troops around Bucharest.
In the afternoon Mihai Antonescu came again; he had a meeting with Clodius and Killinger to prepare our exit from the war.
The situation is bad on the Moldavian front and on the Dniester River. In Bessarabia the front is broken, and the Russians are advancing toward Cogalnic, where they will encounter weak forces.
PRESIDENT OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS FOR THE FIRST TIME
Wednesday, August 23, 1944. A memorable day, which will be recorded in the history of our nation.
Most of the night I struggled with the bad news that kept coming from the front. I hear the marshal came from the front and called a cabinet meeting in Snagov, where he will probably make a last decision; if only it was the right decision, namely to ask for an armistice and end the hostilities!
Dinu Brătianu is telling me over the phone to go see him immediately. At 9.30 AM I am at his place, where he tells me he sent Gheorghe Brătianu to Antonescu to decide in favor of an armistice; he also tells me Maniu sent Mihalache there for the same purpose. I discuss a political government in the event the marshal resigns with Dinu Brătianu, but he shows intransigence, opining that, considering the circumstances, we can only form a military government. Therefore, my proposal to have a political government has fallen. [...]
By 11.30 AM the Presidency of the Council of Ministers calls me over the phone and I speak with Mihai Antonescu, who asks me whether the king is in Bucharest. I tell him he is, and then Mihai Antonescu tells me he will come to the palace with the marshal to see the king at 3.30 PM. [...]
At 3.30 PM Mihai Antonescu arrived alone; the marshal was about 15 minutes late. When he arrived we went to the Little House, where the king was waiting for us. We went into the salon – the king, the marshal, Mihai Antonescu, and myself – and we sat around a round table. In the next room, which was the king’s office, Buzeşti, Stârcea, General Aldea, Colonel Dămăceanu, General Anton, and Ioaniţiu were waiting impatiently.
I will try to transcribe this meeting between the king and the two Antonescu men as faithfully as possible, because many people will try to distort the truth.
From the very beginning I must say that we had not planned to arrest them, because we deeply believed they had come to offer their resignations, which we believed likely because it would have been very delicate for them to sign the armistice, since measures against the Germans had to be taken.
After we sat down at the table, the king asked:
“What is the situation, marshal?”
“Desperate, Your Majesty. The front is penetrated both in Moldavia and in Bessarabia.”
As he usually does, the marshal begins to go on the offensive, blaming the army for this disaster as they no longer wanted to fight due to the agitation staged by the politicians, and he even suggested that the king and myself are partly to blame, because we talked to politicians and we encouraged them in their action. The king is patient enough to let him let off steam, and then, taking advantage of a break, he asks:
“What must we do? Don’t you believe it is time to sign an armistice, either yourself or another government?”
The marshal categorically replies that we must not sign an armistice.
Both the king and myself are flabbergasted, which Mihai Antonescu probably sees, and he intervenes:
“We could request an armistice, but let us wait for two more days, because some responses from Ankara and Madrid are expected.”
“Mr. Vice President,” I say, “don’t you believe that by waiting for two more days we run the risk of having the armistice conditions withdrawn from us, and we will fall into unconditional surrender? I feel the events are precipitating, and this is a matter of hours, not days.”
His Majesty the King speaks to the marshal:
“What are your plans?”
“We will try to hold out on the fortified Focşani-Oancea-Bolgrad front,” replies the marshal.
“With what?” I ask, “since the fortification work is not ready yet, and the withdrawing German and Romanian troops will not be able to occupy those positions, because they are withdrawing in a very disorderly manner.”
“With battalions of conscripts,” says the marshal, “which I have already sent there, and with other troops that will come from within. In fact, if we are not successful in stopping the enemy along that line, we will withdraw to the mountains, and will try to hold out there, we cannot forsake the Germans.”
Faced with this categorical response, the king stood up, and, without saying one word, shook hands with them and went out. The marshal and Mihai Antonescu were left with me standing, in torturing silence.
The people in the king’s office heard the conversation and took the arresting measures; as soon as the king went into the office where they were, he approved the arrest of the marshal and Mihai Antonescu and the coup.
Very soon after the king left, Major Anton Dumitrescu of the palace guard battalion came into the salon with four soldiers, and he arrested the marshal and Mihai Antonescu. The marshal grew yellow, and he spoke to me – how could we offend him like that? I did not answer anything, because I was anxious as well, as I was aware of the ensuing hardships and responsibilities.
It was 5 PM. We all went to my office in the palace with the king, to begin the work we had to do.
Colonel Dămăceanu went immediately to the Bucharest Command, to alert the troops and cut the telephone links between the German commands and their troops. The plan had been devised up to the tiniest details, all we had to do was apply it.
*
The king dictated the decree by which I was appointed president of the Council of Ministers. Armed with it, I went to the General Staff to give the necessary orders to the troops on the front and in the rest of the country to abort the hostilities and to regroup.
The chief of the General Staff was not in Bucharest, so I went into the office of the deputy chief, General Arhip, and I placed the decree appointing me prime minister and signed by the king on his desk. General Arhip told me:
“No surprise, this was to be expected. Please, what are your orders?” [...]
When I finished at the General Staff, I went back to the palace, and first I made phone calls summoning General C. Vasiliu (inspector of gendarmes), General Pantazi (war minister), and Colonel Elefterescu (prefect of the police), in order to arrest them, because they would have been able to counteract my decisions. Not suspecting anything, all three of them showed up immediately, and they were arrested.
Meanwhile, the troops in and around Bucharest had received their orders, and they were all going to their assigned dispositions.
It was beginning to get dark. Total tranquility. Nobody suspected anything yet about what had just happened.
We formed the government:
- President of the Council of Ministers: Adjutant Army General C. Sănătescu.
- Ministers without portfolios:
1) Iuliu Maniu, leader of the National Peasant Party
2) Dinu Brătianu, leader of the National Liberal Party
3) Titel Petrescu, leader of the Social Democratic Party
4) Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu, representative of the Communist Party
- Ad Interim Minister of Justice: Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu [...]
At 10 PM, His Majesty the King read the proclamation that declared a cessation of the hostilities and accepted the armistice on the radio. As soon as they heard, the people came to Palace Square, where they manifested warmly in support of the king.
Now was the time when the agitation began, because everybody supports the coup and the arrest of the marshal and Mihai Antonescu. We are in great danger, because the Germans will react, although we have taken measures to neutralize them – but who knows whether our measures will be efficient?
August 28, 1944. I organized the commission that will go to Moscow to sign the armistice. I would have liked Maniu and Brătianu to go, because the commission would have been different with them, but they refused, saying they could not sign a deed recognizing the surrender of Bessarabia and Bukovina. So I had to send Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu as commission chairman, as he says he has ties with Russian politicians. I worked until late at night with this commission to complete all the matters referring to our collaboration with the Allies, repealing the Vienna Award, as well as issues referring to foreign troops crossing Romania. [...]
September 1, 1944. I have no news from Moscow; signing the armistice would partly end the current disorder. Saying we are at war, the Russians are robbing everything. The Russian sailors who came ashore in Constanţa are putting up the worst behavior. They are terrifying the city; people are running away in all directions. Complaints from all places where Russians go keep coming to the Presidency of the Council of Ministers. [...]
September 15, 1944. We began to vet every individual article of the armistice in the cabinet meeting. The conditions are hard enough, I could say some of them would belong in an unconditional surrender. They impose on us conditions that will make our domestic situation very hard. Then, the disorder created by the Russian troops will increase the hardships. I foresee great suffering for the people. [...]
October 9, 1944. There is talk about a government crisis, because the Leftist newspapers keep attacking the government’s action in order to create disorder. The Communists are working according to the well-known plan they used in Russia, and there probably is a director sent from Moscow who is in charge of the entire propaganda campaign, because none of our Communists is capable of managing this process, plus none of them has any experience. When I see the street rallies, I immediately compare things to what I saw in Moscow in 1940, and I find a great similitude, even in the signs the protesters are carrying. I am persuaded now that everything is being run by the Russians, unlike Maniu, who still believes the Russians are not interfering in our domestic affairs. Everyday we have rallies where people shout “We want a democratic government!” Lucky everything is orderly, at least for now. [...]
November 4, 1944. For four days I have struggled with the political parties to reach an agreement. Most of all I have difficulties with the Communists and the Socialists, who are demanding six ministries for themselves. I had to make an inflation of ministries to be able to give the same number to the Liberals and to the National Peasant Party. [...]
November 30, 1944. Stormy meeting of the council of ministers, the Communists insist they want the Interior Ministry and the War Ministry. This claim is absurd and unjustified, but they are probably making it to bring about a government crisis. [...]
December 2, 1944. We resumed the talks on the two ministries. Each party has maintained its own position. Considering this situation, I presented my resignation to the king, who accepted it, and that very afternoon the consultations with party leaders began.
By evening, General Rădescu was called, and he accepted the task to form a new government. [...]
January 30, 1945. [...] Our co-belligerent status has not been recognized, although we would have deserved that. We have 14 divisions on the front – apart from the three great powers, nobody has such effectives, the French barely have three or four divisions. We managed to move the frontline from Iaşi to Budapest, 1,000 kilometers, definitely shortening the war. [...]
March 6, 1945. The king gave in to Vyshinsky and formed a government under the premiership of Petru Groza – leader of the Plowmen’s Front – with Gheorghe Tătărescu, leader of the Liberal Party, as vice president of the Council of Ministers. This government, called the Democratic National Front (FND), includes members of the Communist Party and of the Social Democratic Party, while the oldest and most popular parties, the National Liberal Party of Dinu Brătianu and the National Peasant Party of Iuliu Maniu, were left out. The Russians and the Communists view them as historical, Rightist, and even antidemocratic parties.
I, too, opined that the king should give in, so as to have tranquility in this country, because, with any other government that the Russians did not like, we would have had movements and most of all strikes, which would have hindered the activity. I know this government will not accomplish much, but I still hope for some tranquility.
Eventually, General Vasiliu Răşcanu became war minister, as the Russians and the Communists had wanted for a long time.
March 7, 1945. [...] I went to the [War] Ministry, where the presentation of Minister Răşcanu was scheduled. On that occasion I made a speech to the minister and chiefs of the army, asking the new minister to observe the traditions of the army, which have constituted its power and honor in the past, and to fight to keep politics out of the military, unlike the current tendency. [...]
March 12, 1945. After the government was formed the way the Russians wanted, we were allowed to occupy Transylvania – so I took a special train to Cluj, to go to the ceremony. Very many Russians were invited, because the British and US missions refused to participate in the ceremony; whence, all kinds of comments. [...]
March 14, 1945. In the afternoon, huge rallies of the FND, at the palace, and at the Russian Legation.
At the last moment I got an invitation over the phone for dinner at the Russian Legation. I barely arrived in time because the streets were full of people who went to the rallies. The government, the mayor, the Bucharest commander, and myself have been invited to this dinner. Ana Pauker was the only invited woman. The speeches began, which were characterized by flattery and platitudes. Ana Pauker spoke as well; I hear her for the first time. She speaks good Romanian, without a very strong Jewish accent; she speaks kind of fast, and without a beautiful intonation, to say nothing of the fact that her speech is common, so I was disappointed, because people said she was such an intelligent woman. [...]
March 23, 1945. The Agrarian Law was passed, confiscating any piece of property over 50 hectares. This is a typically Communist law, and it will create much discontent, because there are too few pieces of property to satisfy all the peasants.
With this law, the government has managed to spread poverty to large cultivators as well, without benefiting the peasants.
March 30, 1945. The end is near. The entire allied front is moving. [...]
Many officers have been dismissed from the army, some with good reason, but many because they did not please the Russians or the Communists.
April 1945. The government’s newspapers are competing with each other to laud the fruitful activity of the government and to point to the benefits that have fallen over this country. Very well, but I do not understand why they attack the previous governments. In various newspaper articles as well as in speeches on the radio or at meetings, the following sentence is being reiterated very often, like a leitmotif: the governments that have preceded the current government, which is one of broad democratic concentration, were governments of reactionaries, or they sabotaged the armistice, or the agriculture, or democracy, or the achievements of labor unions, or the purging of the state apparatus, and so on, according to the imagination of the journalist, speaker, or orator.
I am not a politician, and I entered into the political mechanism by accident, due to the posts I held before August 23, 1944. However, I realize that the accusations brought against the governments I was the head of are unfair, and I explain this by the bad habit we have, namely to throw dirt on the past. When a new government is brought to the helm, an agenda with the matters that government has to solve is developed. Therefore, a government can only be criticized over the way in which it solved the matters at hand, fully or partially, and over the means it used. Any criticism on other bases than the ones above is biased.
On August 23, when the king honored me with forming the government, these were the matters I had to solve:
1) To take Romania out of the war alongside Germany.
2) To conclude an armistice with the Allies.
3) To cleanse the Romanian soil of Germans, in order to avoid war on the national soil.
4) To cover the Soviet army for future operations.
5) To organize the implementation of the armistice in all sincerity.
6) The participation of the Romanian army, with a maximum of effort, [in the war] up to the complete defeat of Germany.
The first five planks were favorably solved by the first government I was the head of; the last plank – which required a wider development over time – has been implemented by all the governments since August 23 to date, and I have been actively involved in that, not only as head of two governments, but most of all as chief of the General Staff.
April 27, 1945. [...] In this country they continue to arrest people and send them to camps, those camps that were so toughly criticized in Antonescu’s time; I see the current government has re-established them. [...]
April 30, 1945. Mussolini was caught at the Swiss border and taken to Milan, where he was shot by partisans together with another 15 Fascist chiefs. This was his end of a 23-year dictatorship. However, let us be fair and admit that at first he did great favors to his country, getting rid of Communists and chaos. However, the moment he devised Italy’s imperialism, sided with Germany, and, most of all, the moment he attacked France in such an undignified manner, he signed his own death sentence.
News is coming from Germany that Hitler, too, is alleged to have died, and Himmler has allegedly requested unconditional surrender of all the Allies. [...]
May 1, 1945. Labor Day was celebrated for the first time in this country with great pomp. In Victory Square they erected rostrums, and columns of workers from all the factories in and around Bucharest marched by those rostrums between 10 AM and 6 PM. A very tiresome day for everybody. In fact, this celebration was rather an apology of Russia and Communism; portraits of Lenin, Stalin, Karl Marx, Engels, and so on everywhere, and very few portraits of King Mihai. [...]
May 9, 1945. The government decided this is the day when the hostilities ended. On our front, the operations are still going on, because the Germans did not capitulate in Czechoslovakia.
Great joy in Bucharest. Everybody is in the street. [...]
May 22, 1945. The public has focused lately on the first trial of war criminals. There were rallies against them, the press also attacked them, so they were sentenced to death. [...]
Among those condemned there are those who deserve the punishment, because they have committed barbaric deeds. [...]
May 29, 1945. The appeal filed by the first lot of convicted war criminals, who had appealed to the Court of Cassation, was rejected today, so both the People’s Tribunal and the death penalty are constitutional; however, there is no such thing in our Constitution. [...]
June 1, 1945. Negel, the palace marshal, comes to ask me what is to be done, because all the men sentenced to death asked the king to commute their sentences. I said the king must show clemency, especially because the sentences were imposed under street pressure. [...]
June 9, 1945. It seems both the Russians and the government want me out of the General Staff, and this is why they asked the king to replace me. [...]
June 11, 1945. When the military operations were over, I wanted to publish a communiqué of the General Staff in newspapers, describing our contribution to the war alongside the Allies, for the entire country to know and be proud of what the army has done. I was not allowed to do so. Then, I published this communiqué on my own in a brochure, which I distributed for free. [...]
October 1945. [...]
The Russians attack passenger trains and rob the passengers; in those trains, one or two carriages are reserved for Romanian officers, but the Russians brutally chase them out and occupy the carriages. [...]
November 3, 1945. Some prisoners of war have begun to arrive from Russia, but only lower ranks and in the most terrible shape. They send back only those who can no longer work because they are too weak. And I remember how well we treated the Russian prisoners of war, who no longer wanted to go home. [...]
March 6, 1946. One year since the current government took office. Severe orders have been issued to organize supporting rallies. Even the army was ordered to participate in those rallies with 70 percent of the effectives, and they developed lists, to make sure the orders would be carried out. This – the army participating in political acts – is happening for the first time in Romania.
June 1, 1946. Today at 10.30 AM the Justice Ministry submitted to the king the applications to commute the death sentences imposed by the People’s Tribunal. Following the government’s proposal, the king rejected the applications of Marshal Antonescu, Mihai Antonescu, General Vasiliu, and Alexianu, whose death sentences remained definitive. Today at 6 PM the four were executed at the Jilava prison. This is the end of the Antonescu adventure.
The king would have commuted all the sentences, but the Russians disagreed. It seems that the Anglo-Americans also opined that the marshal and Mihai Antonescu had to be executed.
The execution of the four was barbaric, because they did not use a platoon of trained soldiers, they used some Communist guards who could barely fire a weapon. They needed many shots to kill them. [...]
November 19, 1946. Sad day of remembrance: four years since the Romanian army was crushed on the Don River. The government, instead of observing a day of mourning, organized parliamentary elections today. I believe the date was chosen by the Russians to mock us [...].
November 22, 1946. It is only today that they published the definitive election results. The telegrams that arrived on November 20 from the polling stations were disastrous for the government, which panicked. Then, urged by the Russians, they made the “heroic” decision to use force. The representatives of the opposition were chased out of the polling stations, and completely different lists of results were made.
These are the results: the government – 348 deputies; the National Peasant Party (Maniu) – 32 deputies; the Hungarian Union – 29 deputies; the National Liberal Party (Brătianu) – three deputies; the democratic peasants (Lupu) – two deputies; total – 414 deputies [...]
March 9, 1947. Many arrests, mostly members of the National Peasant Party, made in recent nights. The political prisoners were taken to Aiud in chains. [...]
March 28, 1947. [...]
In this country the chaos is increasing. The green dictatorship of Antonescu was replaced with the red dictatorship of the Communists, which is even more terrible.
The Communists are bracing to stage a coup when the Russians leave, disorganizing that part of the army that does not support them, and organizing the units they count on, especially the Tudor Vladimirescu Division. In Bucharest there are only units subordinated to the Russians, so the coup is easy to stage. [...]
Food is rare, and we get bread only very seldom. [...]
Everyday people discover frauds committed by the Communists, who rob everything.
March 29, 1947. England was the first country to have ratified our peace treaty. In the House of Commons they vetted every detail, and Conservative MP Savory expressed his regret that Bessarabia was not given to Romania. A foreigner can see the situation of Bessarabia well, while the Romanian Communists maintain that Russia is entitled to that province; if it was up to them, I think they would give all of Romania to the Russians. [...]
May 1, 1947. Labor Day. Celebrated with a great rally in Victory Square, with the representatives of Russia and the government attending. Workers were forced to participate. No enthusiasm. The photographs of Engels, Marx, Lenin, and Stalin everywhere, no photograph of the king. I wonder why should anyone post the photographs of these aliens here, who have nothing to do with Romania. [...]
May 6, 1947. [...] The key to the future of mankind is either Communism or US democracy.
May 9, 1947. Victory day was celebrated, because the Russians chose this date. We should actually celebrate it on May 10, when there was the ceasefire on the front of the Romanian armies in 1945.
A ceremony was held at the Military Club, where the king decorated a few Russian officers.
May 11, 1947. [...] Now it is obvious that the parties in our government are completely pushed aside and the Communists take all the initiatives. I do not know what Groza and Tătărescu think, their parties are not even mentioned any more.
In Bucharest, at the Royal Palace, His Majesty King Mihai was decorated by President Truman [...]. The interesting thing is that they appreciate the king’s deed on August 23 correctly, and they accept that it was just us, without any Russian help, who chased away the Germans from this country, moving the front 500 kilometers to the west. Our newspapers, which are controlled by the Communist censorship, did not cover this important event adequately.
June 1947. This month is characterized by an intense activity of the Communist Party in order to take control of the parties forming the government. They managed to take all the initiatives, and the president and vice-president of the government are now prisoners of the Communist Party. [...]
July 2, 1947. [...] In Romania, Russia has even decided what officers and non-commissioned officers to be dismissed from the military. The appointments to important posts and to diplomatic posts are only being made in Russia; the passports to leave Romania are only being issued by Russia – and at a very high price. Nothing is being done domestically without Russia’s approval. [...]
July 14, 1947. The interior minister, in order to get rid of the leadership of the National Peasant Party, has set them up, pretending they wanted to run away abroad. For that, they arrested the leaders at night, and they shipped them to an airport, where the police, who had been announced, came and caught them. [...] Invoking these reasons, that they wanted to run away, they arrested Mihalache, vice-president of the party, and Penescu, secretary general, with other leaders. Iuliu Maniu is under house arrest. Now the terror is beginning against the National Peasant Party, the strongest and most popular party in this country, and the one the Communists are afraid of. There must be a divine justice that will avenge the horrors and injustice being committed now!
The interior minister is probably planning a setup for the Liberal party and the independent Socialist party as well, in order to destroy the entire opposition, so we will end up like in Russia, having only one party, the Communist one. [...]
July 25, 1947. The conducted investigations suggest that the National Peasant Party leaders were really trying to run away abroad, so it was not a setup, they fell into a trap. Anyway, it was a mistake to run away, leaving the battlefield inside the country.
August 1947. This month is rich in domestic events, because the strongest and most popular party – the National Peasant Party – was completely dissolved, and its leaders, with Iuliu Maniu at the top, have been arrested. [...]
Another event was the stabilization made by the government – in very surprising circumstances. It was not a stabilization, it was a confiscation of fortunes, because people only had the right to exchange a very small sum of money, that can barely keep one alive for a few days. The merchants and peasants, who had large sums of money, have been ruined completely; they saw their work wasted because they were not able to exchange that money. [...]
The Communist Party is in charge of everything, and the other parties in the bloc no longer exist. I believe the government will only be made up of Communists soon.
August 23, 1947. This day was celebrated pompously enough, but the king and his collaborators were not mentioned. The Communist Scânteia [Spark] daily even says the entire action on August 23 is due to the Communist Party and Gheorghiu-Dej, who led the operations from prison. [...]
Russia has ordered us and the Bulgarians to ratify the peace treaty in parliament.
August 30, 1947. Finally Russia has ratified the peace treaty with Romania. Let us see whether it will implement the treaty and withdraw its troops from Romania, leaving only those that guard the communication lines with Austria. If the Russians began to leave this country, that would be a great relief for us, because keeping them here has drained us completely.
General Constantin SĂNĂTESCU (1885-1947) served on the front in World War II and as a close aide to King Mihai I, who appointed him prime minister of Romania following the August 23, 1944 coup, when the country turned against Nazi Germany. He served in that capacity until December 7, 1944. This Diary covers the years between 1937-1947, and brings Sănătescu’s insight into the main events of his time.
Translated by Monica Voiculescu
